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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
GCC   Gulf Cooperation Council 
GS   General Security 
ICCPR   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICESCR  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
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IOM   International Organization for Migrations 
KSA   Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
LMRA   Labour Market Regulatory Authority 
MoL   Ministry of Labour  
NGO    Non-Governmental Organization 
SORAL  Syndicate of the Owner of Recruitment Agencies in Lebanon 
UAE   United Arab Emirates 
UDHR   Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
As the process of globalization deepens around the world, migration increases due to 
worldwide transformations that affect the economic, social and political spheres. This trend 
has been reflected by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) World Migration 
Report 2020, which estimates the number of international migrants to be 272 million globally, 
of which around two thirds are labor migrants . 1
This paper focuses on labor migration in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council states 
(GCC), Lebanon, and Jordan. In these countries, labor migration has been particularly 
contributory for their development by creating abundant job positions, especially in the areas 
of construction and domestic work that have been occupied by migrant workers from other 
Arab countries, South-East Asia, and more recently Africa . This phenomenon has had two 2
major consequences. Firstly, it presents a major benefit for the migrant workers, who provide 
billions of dollars in remittances for their families and countries of origin . Another benefit is 3
for the host countries, where there has been a colossal development in their economies and 
societies through imported cheap labor, to the extent that major changes in the population size 
and other demographic variables have been observed. Currently, all GCC countries, with the 
exception of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Oman, have a larger migrant 
population than nationals . 4
In general, there is a paucity in reliable and updated data on foreign migration in these 
countries, so it is challenging to estimate the impact of the phenomenon. This is partly due to 
the difficulties in recording demographical data, including the lack of mechanisms and 
authorities that take part in this process. Moreover, population-based statistics are rarely 
updated in the region because of political implications. This limitation forces researchers to 
rely on estimations and inaccurately generated data . Migrants, and subsequently migrant 5
workers, are directly affected by the aforementioned issues that can lead to irregularity and 
neglect in the receiving country. On the other hand, there is also a proportion of migrant 
workers that entered the host country illegally or under a tourist visa, since their countries of 
origin prohibited their employment in some of the host countries. However, due to the 
stigmatization and false expectations of higher wages and ideal working conditions, 
prospective migrant workers would most likely still enter the country without being recorded 
as a labor migrant. 
 International Organization for Migrations (2020) “World Migration Report 2020”. Available at: https://1
publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf [Last consulted: 3rd March 2020]
 European Commission (2010) “Occasional paper 60” Volume 1. Page 56. Available at: https://cadmus.eui.eu/2
bitstream/handle/1814/15254/Labour%20Markets%20Study_vol_I.pdf?sequence= [Last consulted: 4th March 
2020]
 International Labor Organization (2017) “Labour Migration in the Arab States”. Available at: https://3
www.ilo.org/beirut/areasofwork/labour-migration/WCMS_514910/lang--en/index.htm [Last consulted: 3rd 
March 2020]
 International Organization for Migrations (2020) “World Migration Report 2020”. Available at: https://4
publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf [Last consulted: 11th March 2020]
 UN/POP/EGM/2006/09/Rev, 5 September 2006.5
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Nonetheless, the benefits of the labor migration can be easily overshadowed by the fact that 
the foreign labor policies in the host countries are notorious for their exploitative nature and 
the asymmetric relationship between the employer and the employee, which places the 
migrant in a very vulnerable situation. The term of this migration policy is coined the Kafala 
system, although more recently most of these countries have been trying to include it under 
the sponsorship system . Even though the Kafala and sponsorship systems share basic 6
characteristics, they are not exactly identical. For instance, the sponsorship system can be 
found all over the world, whereas the Kafala is specific to the aforementioned countries, and 
possesses many characteristics that are unique from the sponsorship system. Other 
particularities for the Kafala are, in general terms, that it is customary practice, which creates 
gaps in terms of the migrant worker's protection. Consequently, the migrant is more prone to 
abuse, which lead many researchers and journalists to describe the Kafala as a form of 
modern day slavery . 7
Thus, Kafala is the system under which migrant workers are recruited, but also stands as a 
mechanism to manage and control labor migration. It gives the framework that defines the 
relationship between the employer and the migrant worker, binding the latter to the former not 
only as per the labor contract, but also as per the residency permits in the host country. This 
renders the migrant worker completely dependent on their employer, who not only satisfy 
their labour needs, but also exercise a high amount of control over the life of the worker. For 
this reason, the system has been criticized by the international community due to the 
understanding that it opens doors to violations of human rights and internationally recognized 
labor standards  . 8 9
These critiques are various, but they can be summarized into two main ideas. One, the fact 
that the migrant worker is completely submissive to the will of the employer, who has the 
responsibility of renewing the residence permit. Secondly, the system does not provide any 
mechanism that aims to protect the migrant worker. This fact can be exemplified with many 
common, exploitative situations. Passport confiscation, for instance, ensures that the worker 
will not abandon the place of employment without fulfilling duties. Threats, concerning the 
renewal or papers or false reporting to the police for example, from the employer can serve as 
a means for obedience under certain conditions. Moreover, there have been cases of migrant 
workers that have been detained and deported when they had reported cases of abuse and 
 Sponsorship systems are migration policies that are applied in several countries in Asia, as well as in the US, 6
Australia or Canada. This system is characteristic by being protective of the national workforce by making sure 
it does not displace it by recruiting migrant workforce. Then, a business or a company can sponsor a foreign 
worker to work exclusively with them and this person’s residency will be tied to that workplace.
 For example Amnesty International; Human Rights watch, Migrant Forum in Asia, etc.7
 K. Robinson (2020) “What is the Kafala System?” Council of Foreign Relations. Available at: https://8
www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-kafala-system [Last consulted 19th January 2021]
 Business and Human Rights Resource center (2021) “14 Governments call on Lebanon to end exploitative 9
Kafala Labour sponsorship system, following UN Human Rights Council Review” Available at: https://
www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/14-governments-call-for-an-end-to-sponsorship-kafala-in-
lebanon/ [Last consulted 12th March 2021]
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exploitation  . These situations are not per se compiled in the Kafala as a norm, thus it is 10 11
not a legal common practice that the system enables, but more of a behavior that it does not 
regulate. In essence, the Kafala system enables labor precariousness, making migrant workers 
easy to replace, which exacerbates situations of abuse and exploitation. However, the 
economic incentives for both receiving and sending countries still encourage its application. 
Moreover, recruitment agencies and brokers, who act as mediators that link migrants to 
employers, also profit from this system by rendering the migrants victims of debt bondage 
due to imposed fees prior to the migration process, making them even more vulnerable 
targets. 
In particular, this paper focuses specifically on migrant domestic workers in the GCC 
countries, Lebanon, and Jordan. In these countries, domestic work is the single most 
important category of employment among migrant women . Among all the foreign workforce 12
that falls under the scope of a Kafala agreement or contract, the migrant domestic workers are 
the most vulnerable of them all. One of the reasons would be that cohabitating with the 
employer increases their level of dependency, since it affects their daily sustenance, as well as 
facilitating exploitation and abuse. Moreover, migrant domestic workers are particularly the 
least protected among migrants, not only because it is much more difficult to verify what 
happens in a household “behind closed doors”, but also because domestic work is not 
included in the labor laws of most countries in the region .  13
Migrant workers are exposed to racial discrimination worldwide, and the GCC countries, 
Lebanon, and Jordan are no exceptions. It is partly a consequence of them being employed in 
jobs that are perceived by these societies as inferior, or “the lowest level”. Cultural differences 
are an additional factor that worsens discrimination, which becomes more prominent in 
countries where the Kafala is applied and the number of migrants exceeds the number of 
natives, since preserving the national identity is believed to be jeopardized. The system 
procreates racial discrimination and the alternatives that have been presented during the last 
years do not aim to address this particular problem. In addition, migrant domestic workers 
also face gender-based discrimination. This is because migrant domestic workers tend to be 
females that are working -and according to Kafala, also living- in the household of their 
employer. Such a situation puts the domestic workers not only at risk of exploitation, 
violence, and isolation, but also physical, sexual, and psychological abuse. 
For example, in Lebanon, the country of the main case-study of this paper, an average of two 
migrant domestic workers die each week according to data from the Lebanese General 
Security, media reports, and Human Rights organizations. These deaths, mainly due to suicide 
 K. Tahir (2019) “The Kafala system in Saudi Arabia as a form of modern slavery” Research for the Norwegian 10
University of Science and Technology. Pages 3 - 8
 Amnesty International (2019) “Their house is my prison: exploitation of migrant domestic workers in 11
Lebanon” Pages 16 - 30
 International Labour Organization (2004) “Gender and Migration in Arab States: The case of Domestic 12
Workers”. Regional Office for the Arab States, Beirut. Pages. 9 - 20.
 Jordan and Bahrain in some cases include domestic work in their labor law.13
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and escape attempts , are given minimal national media attention and no major prosecution 14
efforts are done by the authorities involved. In many cases, the lack of coverage and action 
occurs because the authorities and the media are challenged by the Lebanese employers, who 
would not provide substantial information, leaving the circumstances of the workers’ deaths 
unexplained . The data on the average deaths of migrant domestic workers has become 15
public since a few years, and it has been observed that their situation has worsened drastically 
in Lebanon since October 2019. The socioeconomic crisis has been deeply detrimental on all 
the Lebanese population, as well as refugees and migrant workers. The impact is reflected in 
job loss, inability to afford basic needs, unpaid or a radical decrease in the value of wages due 
to the devaluation of the local currency. The Lebanese people’s impoverishment has also lead 
to a reluctancy in employing domestic workers. Consequently, this has ensued in the inability 
of migrants to send remittances and support their families back home. The economic crisis 
also incited racial discrimination and worsened the Lebanese society’s opinion on migrants 
occupying their jobs and receiving humanitarian aid . Moreover, the global COVID-19 16
pandemic worsened the living conditions of migrant domestic workers because many of them 
lack access to healthcare. A major obstacle for the regulars, or migrants that are employed 
under a contract, is that their access to healthcare is subjected to the will of their employer. As 
for irregular migrants, the access to healthcare is hindered by the high cost of healthcare or 
lack of documentation due to passport confiscation by their former kafeel. In addition, and 
because of the concern of disease transmission, migrants that work in several households are 
facing difficulties in finding employment and sustaining themselves. In consequence, many 
irregular migrant domestic workers have been evicted and left to survive on the streets in front 
of their embassies, demanding help to leave Lebanon. This would be increasingly common 
when they are not able to afford a ticket back home, or pay the large fees that the Lebanese 
authority imposes when a migrant worker falls into an irregular situation . There, they have 17
encountered other desperate migrant domestic workers, whose kafeels abandoned them in 
front of their embassy with their luggage and with many months of wages unpaid. 
These situations are just a glimpse of what the Kafala system enables. However, little has 
been done to address it. In Lebanon, efforts were done to draft a Unified Standard Contract 
(SUC) for all recruitment agencies and employers and employees to abide by . This contract 18
that claims to balance rights and duties for both employers and employees was an initiative by 
the Lebanese Ministry of Labor (MoL) with the support of the International Labor 
 Human Rights Watch (2020) “Lebanon: Abolish Kafala “Sponsorship” system” Report. Available at: https://14
www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/27/lebanon-abolish-kafala-sponsorship-system [Last consulted March 12th 2021]
 D. Dermitzaki and S. Riewendt (2020) “The Kafala System: Gender and Migration in Contemporary 15
Lebanon.” Middle East Topics and Arguments; Nº 14. Pages 105 - 114.
 The Tahirir Institute For Middle East Policy (2020) “Lebanon’s Multiple Crises Also Expose the Racist Kafala 16
System” Available at: https://timep.org/commentary/analysis/lebanons-multiple-crises-also-expose-the-racist-
kafala-system/ [Last consulted: 4th April 2020]
 Randhawa M. (2020) “Hardships for Migrant Domestic Workers rise” Humans Rights Watch. Available at: 17
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/14/hardships-lebanons-migrant-domestic-workers-rise [Last consulted: 13th 
March 2021]
 UNHCR (2009) “Creative solution: a unified contract to protect migrant domestic workers in Lebanon” 18
Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NEWSEVENTS/Pages/UnifiedContractLebanon.aspx [Last consulted: 
13th March 2021]
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Organization (ILO). Even though it is a step forward, it received many critiques  because it 19
left most of the core problems unsolved. It was also presented as an alternative to the 
inclusion of domestic work in the Lebanese Labor Law, which would provide the workers 
with the same protection standards as nationals. After much pressure from the Syndicate of 
the Owners of The Workers Recruitment Agencies in Lebanon (SORAL), the contract was 
eventually never passed. Other countries also adopted or announced their will to adopt 
mechanisms that would provide better working and living conditions for migrant workers. 
Nevertheless, most of these improvements never materialized in practice. On the contrary, 
international critics still condemn Kafala as a system that enables violations of human and 
labor rights. 
In summary, this paper analyzes the Kafala System, which regulates the relationship between 
migrant workers and employers in the countries of the GCC, Jordan, and Lebanon. The norm 
will be interpreted from its origin and its elements, but also under the light of internationally 
recognized labor standards and human rights. 
In particular, the case of Lebanon is exposed to reveal the real circumstances of migrant 
workers living under the Kafala system. Moreover, the impact of the current situation in the 
country, namely the socioeconomic crisis and the global pandemic, on the living and working 
conditions of the migrants is also examined. The main goal of this research is to expose the 
flaws of such a system and understand why change is a necessity. To do so, alternatives to this 
system are challenged to evaluate if they address the current problems, or if, on the contrary, 
other alternatives should be pursued. 
A main idea that is highlighted in the course of this paper is that the Kafala system perpetrates 
an asymmetric relationship between employers and migrant workers, putting the latter in an 
extremely vulnerable situation where their most basic human rights and labor rights as 
internationally recognized can be disrespected. This topic has been tackled widely by many 
researchers who qualified Kafala as a form of modern day slavery. This analysis also focuses 
on alternatives to the Kafala. Ultimately, the hypothesis is that alternatives to the Kafala that 
have been presented in the aforementioned countries, with a focus on Lebanon, do not solve 
major issues, including abuse and exploitation. These alternatives are confronted by the 
personal experiences of migrant domestic workers in Beirut through an exercise of 
comparison that would predict the outcome of situations they faced under the Kafala. These 
experiences are a result of ground-based research and personal interviews with migrant 
domestic workers in Lebanon. 
1.2 Methodology 
To conduct this research I would be resourcing to international primary legal sources, such as 
international conventions, mainly focusing on Human Rights and Labor rights. For that reason 
their binding or non binding effects, depending of the case, would be briefly explained. To be 
able to analyze the Kafala System in the countries were it is applied, and in Lebanon in 
particular, domestic primary legal sources are also used. Primary and secondary research 
 Anti-Racism Movement (2020) “Statement of “MY WORK, MY RIGHTS” Network on the Standard Unified 19
Contract” Available at: https://armlebanon.org/content/statement-“my-work-my-rights”-network-standard-
unified-contract [Last consulted 13th March 2021]
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sources such as books, papers, journals, case studies, and articles will also be analyzed and 
resourced in the course of this study, in addition to the opinions of legal scholars, literature, 
and data collected from Human Rights Organizations. Moreover, real testimonies and 
experiences of migrant domestic workers in the Lebanese context, as well as advocacy actors 
that push for alternatives to Kafala, will be used to empower this analysis. 
The personal interviews with migrant domestic workers residing in Lebanon were conducted 
from January 2021 until March 2021. Reaching out to them was only possible through the 
Lebanese non-governmental organization (NGO) Amel Association, and the trust relationship 
that was built in order for them to share their stories was due to my position as a Field 
Coordinator in the Migrant Workers Support project.  All migrants that consented their stories 
being shared in this paper, under an anonymous name, share two characteristics. Firstly, they 
are all women. Secondly, they are all currently irregular in the country, mainly because they 
ran away from the house of their employer or they escaped the recruitment agency after 
violence, abuse, and exploitation situations. Different nationalities were included in order to 
show how violence, exploitation, and abuse do not differ according to their origin as it does 
with their salaries.  
The elements of the interview were firstly asking for consent and if they would prefer to be 
named under an alias for the purpose of this paper. Secondly, basic information regarding 
nationality, years living in Lebanon, legal status and documentation were asked. Questions 
were conducted to understand their motivations to migrate, how this process took place, and 
whether they were lied to or manipulated to encourage them to migrate. Afterwards, they 
shared their experiences in Lebanon with the employer or employers and recruitment agency 
as regular migrants, with a particular focus on exploitative and abusive situations, but also  on 
discrimination, violence, sexual harassment, isolation, and captivity. Finally, some of them 
also elaborated on the impact and burden of COVID-19 on their situation. Then, they shared 
their desire to stay in Lebanon or go back to their countries, explaining the reasons of their 
decision . Seven interviews were conducted in total, and three of them were selected to be 20
exposed fully in this paper. The others were used to better understand the reality of these 
workers in order to be able to present ideas related to the practices in Lebanon under the 
Kafala system and the impact of modifications and alternatives to it. 
 Some of the interviews took place in the migrant center of Amel Association, in Chiyah neighborhood of 20
Beirut. Others, due to Covid-19 concerns took place over the phone. Notes were taken during those interviews, 
but there is no full transcription of the conversations available. Translator from Arabic to English was needed in 
some cases, but the majority of the interviews were conducted in English.
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2. DEFINING THE KAFALA SYSTEM 
The main objective of this analysis is the Kafala system or sponsorship system . Prior to the 21
disclosure of its controversy and presenting the arguments in its favor and against it, a 
conceptual definition of the system is needed. Kafala needs to be understood as an 
immigration policy, which does not have to necessarily differ from others that can be found 
around the world. It provides a legal framework that defines the relationship between migrant 
workers and their national sponsor, or kafeel, which is usually their employer . This system 22
can be found in the GCC countries, that are Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and in Lebanon, and Jordan. Each country has its 
particularities regarding application, which will be explained at a later stage, nonetheless, 
Kafala mainly regulates the labor relation of unskilled temporary migrant workers, which are 
mostly employed in domestic work and construction.  However, in some countries, Kafala is 
the system that regulates the labor relationship of any foreign worker, unrelated to their skills, 
education level or position, who has to be invited and sponsored by a national in order to be 
able to work and reside in the host country . 23
Another relevant specificity of the Kafala system is its consuetudinary nature . Again, each 24
country has its specificities and some reflections of the sponsorship are gathered in 
administrative regulations and to a lesser extent in local legislation . In this sense, Kafala 25
obeys to a pattern of social behavior that has been long established in the societies of host 
countries. However, the original application and understanding of the Kafala has shifted from 
the current application. 
Nonetheless, its main particularity and the root of all controversy regarding Kafala, is that it 
legally binds the immigration status of the foreign worker to their kafeel, who will be in many 
cases an individual employer. In other words, this system allows the State to delegate its 
responsibility towards the foreign worker in terms of residency, work, and protection to a 
national and particular sponsor. The delegation of responsibility works for both labor status 
and immigration status of the migrant worker, which now becomes a duty of the sponsor to 
manage. Thus, the sponsor will take the role of a mediator between the migrant worker and 
the State, which absolves the host government of providing the foreign worker of any kind of 
labor protection . Then, basic labor rights will be bound to the will of the employer, such as 26
 These two terms will be used in the course of this paper indistinctly.21
 K. Robinson (2020) “What is the Kafala System?” Council of Foreign Relations. Available at: https://22
www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-kafala-system [Last consulted 19th January 2021].
 H.N Malaeb (2015) “The “Kafala” System and Human Rights: Time for a Decision”. Arab Law Quarterly; 23
Brill. Page 311.
 A. Ghaddar; S. Khandaqji; J. Ghattas (2020) “Justifying abuse of women migrant domestic workers in 24
Lebanon: The opinion of recruitment agencies.” 2018 SESPAS; Elsevier España. Pages 493 - 499.
 See for example: Law no. 4 of 2009 Regarding Regulation of the Expatriates Entry, Departure, Residence and 25
Sponsorship. C.O. Issue. 3, Dated 29/03/2009, Page 29.
 A. Pande (2013)  “The paper that you have in your hand is my freedom: Migrant Domestic Work and the 26
Sponsorship (Kafala) System in Lebanon”. International Migration Review 47, no.2. Pages 414 - 418.
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the migrant worker’s ability to end the contract or to change the sponsor . At the same time, 27
the sponsor will be the one responsible for the immigration status of the migrant worker, 
which includes renewing their residency permit. Foreign workers are not able to do so 
independently. Consequently, when the foreign worker does not have a sponsor, it will end in 
an irregular situation as their papers are not renewed. Moreover, if the sponsor fails to oblige 
to their duties towards the migrant worker, they would face no punitive consequences. 
Meanwhile, the foreign worker would face all the consequences of being irregular, namely 
jail, fees, and deportation. Additionally, it binds the migrant worker's entry and exit to the host 
country to the authority of the employer. In such a way, Kafala creates an asymmetric 
relationship between both parties, that puts the migrant worker in a position of complete 
dependency on their sponsor for both livelihood and residency . That also has an impact on 28
other basic rights of the foreigners, such as healthcare, because even though providing an 
insurance to the migrant worker is a responsibility of the sponsor, the migrant needs to 
possess documentations held under the power of the employer to access medical care. 
2.1. Parties 
The Kafala system sets the relationship between two main parties, namely the sponsored 
person or migrant worker, and the sponsor. However, the State also can play a role in this 
relationship and it is postulated that the abusive and exploitative consequences that migrant 
workers might face are a result of the State not assuming that role. Moreover, recruitment 
agencies are a third party that can interfere and are considered an additional kind of sponsor. 
2.1.1 Sponsored person or migrant worker  
This workers’ main characteristics are that they are not to be nationals of the country where 
the labour relation is established, and that they are engaged in a remunerated activity in the 
host country. The International Convention on the Protection of all Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families (1990) defines a “migrant worker” as: 
“person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of 
which he or she is not a national” . 29
In the framework of the Kafala, the sponsored person has other relevant characteristics. One 
of them is that their labor relationship is temporary, and consequently, their stay in the host 
country as well. Migrant workers are not expected to integrate in the host society, rather to 
serve a temporary need of labor and leave . A common misunderstanding, would be the 30
assumption that all sponsored persons are unskilled. Foreign workers in the Arab countries 
that fall under the Kafala system can be businessmen, experts, academic professors, football 
 International Labor Organization (2017) “Employer-Migrant worker relationships in the Middle East: 27
Exploring scope for internal labor market mobility and fair migration”. Regional Office for Arab States; Beirut. 
Page 3.
 Migrant Forum in Asia (2012) “Reform of the Kafala (Sponsorship) system.” Policy Brief No.2. Page 1.28
 UN General Assembly, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 29
Members of their Families, 18 December 1990, A/RES/45/158.
 MD Mizanur Rahman (2011) “Bangladeshi Migrant Workers in the UAE: Gender-Differentiated Patterns of 30
Migration Experiences”. Middle Eastern Studies; Vol 47. Pages 395 - 396.
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players, etc.  Nevertheless, these skilled foreign workers are usually called expats, while 31
unskilled ones would be called migrant workers. This fact shows once more the levels of 
discrimination, even through linguistics. However, migrant workers are typically unskilled, 
mainly working in construction and domestic work, as well as in agriculture, industrial 
production and other service oriented jobs . Being unskilled can, in many cases, mean that 32
these migrant workers are at greater risk of abuse and exploitation through the Kafala system. 
The lack of knowledge about their rights, the system, the culture, and values of the host 
country, once combined with economic instability - which is a recurrent reality - places 
unskilled migrant workers in a very difficult situation that Kafala does not help to solve, but 
rather worsen. 
Migrant domestic workers are at the peak of vulnerability. They are typically females that 
work in the household of their employer. Thus, there is an important part of their vulnerability 
that emanates not only from the fact that they are migrants, or the fact that they are employed 
under Kafala, but because from their gender. In addition, the unregulated nature of the 
domestic work, also contributes to the abuse, violence, and exploitation. The asymmetrical 
relationship between the migrant domestic worker and her employer is exaggerated by the fact 
that, in this case, the migrant worker is not only dependent on the employer in terms of their 
immigration status and job, but also on shelter and daily sustenance. Moreover, even if host 
countries try to regulate and prohibit some of the abusive and exploitative practices that some 
sponsors subject their migrant domestic workers to, it is very difficult to enforce them in the 
privacy of the employer’s home. 
2.1.2 Sponsor
The term sponsor or kafeel means the one who is responsible for some other person or thing. 
In line with this definition, the sponsor could be either an individual employer who is a citizen 
of the host country, a company that includes recruitment agencies, or in certain cases a 
governmental body. The main responsibility of the sponsor is providing the migrant worker a 
visa and a job, since they are to assume legal and economic responsibility for the employee, 
and inform the appropriate authorities of any changes both in the residency status and 
working status. In other words, the sponsor will have control over the migrant worker’s 
internal labour market mobility, such as entry to the host country, renewal of stay, termination 
of employment, transfer of employment, and, in general, exit from the country . Moreover, 33
the sponsor will be responsible for covering the travel expenses and the medical insurance of 
the foreign worker, plus all costs related to the residence permit. However, in general, when 
the sponsors do not fulfill their responsibilities, none to very little action is taken. In some 
countries, they can be blacklisted so they will not be able to sponsor other migrants for a 
quantity of years. Nonetheless, migrants themselves would be the ones penalized by the 
 H.N Malaeb (2015) “The “Kafala” System and Human Rights: Time for a Decision”. Arab Law Quarterly; 31
Brill. Page 311.
 E. Franz (2011) “Exporting Subservience: Sri Lankan Women's Migration for Domestic Work in Jordan”. 32
Department of Anthropology; London School of Economics. Pages 96 - 120.
 International Labor Organization (2017) “Reforming visa sponsorship systems for migrant workers can benefit 33
destination countries in the Middle East”. Press release. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/beirut/media-centre/
news/WCMS_553086/lang--en/index.htm
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inaction of their sponsors, for example, by being deported when their sponsors do not renew 
their residency permit .34
In the majority of cases, the role of the sponsor would be taken by an individual employer, 
who in general would be a national, but not exclusively, since diplomats for example can take 
the role of a sponsor as well. It has been proven that due to the economic responsibilities that 
the sponsor would take, sometimes, the sponsor is not the actual employer of the migrant 
worker. This practice is known as visa trading and it is a fraudulent recruitment practice by 
which a national would sponsor several migrant workers. The migrants would have to pay the 
alleged sponsor for all the costs involved, and would find a job as a freelance . The sponsor 35
as an individual employer is the most standard practice especially for domestic work. It is the 
most worrisome, however, because they tend to exercise their rights in an abusive manner. 
Some of the most common abusive practices are withdrawing the migrant worker's passport, 
often on the basis that it is needed to renew their residency permits; delaying or retaining the 
payment of wages -sometimes on the basis that they had to pay a lot of money to bring the 
migrant that works for them-; prohibiting vacation days and enforcing unlimited working 
hours -particularly affecting migrant domestic workers-; providing inhumane conditions of 
living and starvation -houses without running water or toilets, forcing them to sleep in the 
floor, in the kitchen or in the balcony, with no privacy for migrant domestic workers-; and 
many others.
Another modality is the sponsor being a legal person or a company . The responsibilities in 36
this case are the same, and the consequences can vary. As it happens when the sponsor is a 
natural person, there are companies who abuse their powers over the migrant workers and 
treat them inhumanely, while others do not.
There is yet another figure that can exercise the role of the sponsor and that is usually 
associated with malpractices that can often lead to abusive and exploitative situations for the 
migrant worker. Those are the recruitment agencies, brokers and agents. Their role would be 
to link migrant workers with potential employers in the host country, as well as securing their 
traveling tickets and their entry visa. Recruitment agencies usually operate both in the country 
of origin and in the host country. In the country of origin, many agencies tend to falsify 
market information in terms of working conditions, wages, employer’s information, and 
expectations in order to get potential applicants to migrate. Many times, the recruitment 
agencies impose the migrants very high fees to secure their migration process. This practice is 
illegal, since the future employer would be covering those fees. This also leaves many 
migrants at a situation of debt even before having the opportunity to migrate . In the host 37
country, recruitment agencies, are known to encourage employers on exercising abusive 
 ALEF (2019) “Promotion and Protection of Rights of Migrant Domestic Workers”. Pages 14 - 20.34
 S. Sönmez, Y. Apostopoulos, D. Tran and S. Rentrope, (2011)“Human rights and health disparities for 35
migrant workers in the UAE Human rights and health disparities for migrant workers in the UAE”, Health 
Human Rights 13(2). Available at: https://www.hhrjournal.org/2013/08/human-rights-and-health-disparities-for-
migrant-workers-in-the-uae/ 
 For example RAMCO construction and waste management company in Lebanon. See more details about their 36
recent scandal at https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/05/ramco-strike-key-moment-labor-rights-lebanon#
 F.T Malit Jr; G.S Naufal (2016) “Asymmetric information under the Kafala Sponsorship System: Impacts on 37
Foreign Domestic Workers’ Income and Employment Status in the GCC countries”. Institute for the Study of 
Labor. Discussion paper series; No 9941. Pages 7 - 19.
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practices towards the migrants and infringing violence to the migrants that would object to 
them . Another common malpractice exercised by recruitment agencies is to “bribe” the 38
migrant workers in exchange of sponsoring. In these cases, the migrant worker would be 
paying themselves all the fees related to their residency permit, while the recruitment agency 
would only appear as the real sponsor. However, many times the agency would demand that 
they pay much higher than the actual fee, threatening the migrant with reporting them to the 
authorities for being irregular in case they do not comply.
Finally, for some foreign workers who are skilled, the local government can take the role of 
the sponsor. When this happens, the worker is treated humanely in the framework of the 
Kafala system. For this reason, experts suggest that this should be the modality adopted for all 
migrant workers . However, it seems to contradict one of the main purposes of the whole 39
system, which is waiving the responsibility from the State.
2.2. Origins of the Kafala System  
Kafala, in the Arabic language, can have a variety of meanings depending on the context 
where the noun is used. Even though the origin of the word literally translates to the term 
“guarantee”, it is used to signify “to provide”, “to be responsible for”, or “to be the legal 
guardian” in different contexts. All four schools of the Islamic jurisprudence agree on 
understanding Kafala as “guarantee”, since the term appears in its origins in the Sharia, both 
in the Quran and the Sunnah . Accordingly, it needs to be understood in its origins as a 40
contract that unites two parts, the kafeel and the makful, where the former will assume liability 
for the latter in various specified terms in front of the state or authorities. Thus, the kafeel 
would be responsible for any breach of law committed by the makful. This contract could be 
used in several contexts, such as the payment of a financial liability, the presence or 
appearance of a certain person at a certain time and place, the delivery of goods, or the 
purchase of goods sold . Moreover, as pointed by E. Franz, the figure of Kafala can also be 41
found in the Ottoman jurisprudence. However, their use of the term is once again in the sense 
of a “guarantee”, from which the current application of the term would not have evolved from 
it . Therefore, researchers that analyzed the origins of the Kafala have concluded that one 42
can not draw a connection from the original application and meaning to the one used today, 
 F.T Malit Jr; G.S Naufal (2016) “Asymmetric information under the Kafala Sponsorship System: Impacts on 38
Foreign Domestic Workers’ Income and Employment Status in the GCC countries”. Institute for the Study of 
Labor. Discussion paper series; No 9941. Pages 7 - 19.
  H.N Malaeb (2015) “The “Kafala” System and Human Rights: Time for a Decision”. Arab Law Quarterly; 39
Brill. Page 318.
 Azhari A (2016-2017) “The Kafala “Sponsorship” System in Saudi Arabia: A critical analysis from the 40
perspective of international Human Rights and Islamic Law”; The SOAS Journal of Postgraduate Research, 
Volume 10. Page 63.
 Jureidini, R., & Hassan, S. F. (2019). " The Islamic Principle of Kafala as Applied to Migrant Workers: 41
Traditional Continuity and Reform". In Migration and Islamic Ethics. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. Chapter 6. 
Pages 94 - 96.
 E. Franz (2011) “Exporting Subservience: Sri Lankan Women's Migration for Domestic Work in Jordan”. 42
Department of Anthropology; London School of Economics. Pages 96 - 100.
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and have it described as a “system of oppression and exploitation of migrant labor” . Some 43
of them even classify it as a “genuine contrast” between its origins and current application .  44
How this idea of guarantee evolved to the system of the present is a question that many 
experts tried to answer. For some  , the projection of the guarantee in labor contracts 45 46
between nationals and foreigners appears as a reasonable necessity, that at first, customary 
application of Kafala was able to solve. Thus, this practice would provide a mediator, a 
national, to deal with the relevant authorities in the name of the foreign worker. That would be 
based in the understanding that the migrant worker might, in many cases, have a complete 
lack of knowledge of the administrative procedures in the host country, as well as difficulties 
with the language and understanding the culture . It seems that this practice would have its 47
origins in the Bedouin tradition in GCC countries, where the tribe rules of hospitality would 
consider foreigners as guests and would designate a local to take responsibility for their 
welfare and the consequences of their actions . Following this argument, the extrapolation of 48
the Kafala system to immigration matters would have been in the benefit of the vulnerable, in 
this particular case the migrant worker, by using a legal figure that was already integrated in 
the host society. Nevertheless, one can not forget one of the main points of disconnection 
between the original idea of Kafala and the one that is applied nowadays to migrant workers, 
which is the loss of responsibility of the kafeel. This difference depletes the system of its 
protective character, resulting in a highly asymmetrical relationship, in which both parties 
have duties. However, the kafeel does not fear any of the consequences related to not fulfilling 
the duties of its own, whereas the foreign worker would be the one assuming all 
repercussions. Then, the set of administrative rules and regulations that diminished the 
migrant worker of any protection in favor of the kafeel, and the unwillingness of the State to 
take part, would be the reasons of the shift in the Kafala system definition. 
For others, the responsibility of such deviation from the original form should be placed 
mainly on the consequences of the oil economy . As a precedent, already in the nineteenth 49
century, the GCC countries started to receive important migratory flows mainly from India 
and Iran, and the sponsorship system presented itself as a way to ensure its control and 
 Jureidini, R., & Hassan, S. F. (2019). "The Islamic Principle of Kafala as Applied to Migrant Workers: 43
Traditional Continuity and Reform". In Migration and Islamic Ethics. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. Chapter 6. 
Page 92.
 E. Franz (2011) “Exporting Subservience: Sri Lankan Women's Migration for Domestic Work in Jordan”. 44
Department of Anthropology; London School of Economics. Pages 96 - 100.
 Azhari A (2016-2017) “The Kafala “Sponsorship” System in Saudi Arabia: A critical analysis from the 45
perspective of international Human Rights and Islamic Law”; The SOAS Journal of Postgraduate Research, 
Volume 10. Pages 60 - 65
 H.N Malaeb (2015) “The “Kafala” System and Human Rights: Time for a Decision”. Arab Law Quarterly; 46
Brill. Pages 321 - 323
 K. Robinson (2020) “What is the Kafala System?” Council of Foreign Relations. Available at: https://47
www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-kafala-system [Last consulted 19th January 2021].
 International Labor Organization (2017) “Employer-Migrant worker relationships in the Middle East: 48
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protection, at a moment were governmental mechanisms to assume this role were minimal . 50
However, the Kafala system as we understand it nowadays would have its origins in the 1960s 
and the 1970s with the discovery of oil. Since then, GCC countries have been one of the 
largest labor markets for foreign workers. They are recruited in a temporary basis and Kafala 
gives the means to import unskilled workers on a rolling basis, preventing them to integrate in 
the host society by applying several restrictions to their personal life and liberties, with the 
ultimate goal of them returning home . This idea was analyzed by M.D.M. Rahman, who 51
described labor migration in the Arab countries generally as demand-driven and South-South, 
as it is for most developing countries. This signifies that policies, such as Kafala, will be 
applied in order to ensure the hiring of temporary foreign workers to meet the labor market 
needs. According to M.D.M Rahman, this system opposes the one of developed countries, 
were foreign workers are expected to not only work but also reside permanently in the host 
country . 52
Nevertheless, experts seem to agree that, one way or another, Kafala shifted from protecting 
the vulnerable to systematically discriminate and abuse them in favor of the Arab identity. 
Thus, it intends to protect the locals in countries, where, due to the high demand of foreign 
manpower, nationals have become a minority in their own country. In consequence, Kafala is 
seen by the nationals of these countries as a hardly needed system that avoids their feeling  of 
being misrepresented and outnumbered in their own country, and that is what gives it 
legitimacy. One can say that it is linked to very racist and discriminatory arguments, such as 
the concerns on the clash of cultures, values and languages, or the increase of criminality 
linked to the growth of migrant labor force. In the eyes of nationals who defend Kafala, this 
system was never meant to protect the migrant workers, but to answer their concerns on 
personal and national identity and security, which are shared concerns around the world 
towards migration . However, one can not forget that national security and Arab identity 53
arguments are being used to decriminalize abuse and exploitation, or even as some would say, 
modern day slavery . 54
2.3 The modern Kafala system 
The Kafala system, as it was mentioned before, is a migration policy that the GCC countries, 
namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates; and other countries in the Arab region, specifically Lebanon and Jordan, apply. 
However, there are some specificities that altogether differentiate the Kafala from other 
sponsorship systems present worldwide and that at the same time puts it at the core of 
international criticism. While analyzing such specificities, one needs to take into 
 E. Franz (2011) “Exporting Subservience: Sri Lankan Women’s Migration for Domestic Work in Jordan”. 50
Department of Anthropology; London School pf Economics. Pages 96 - 100
 MD Mizanur Rahman (2011) “Bangladeshi Migrant Workers in the UAE: Gender-Differentiated Patterns of 51
Migration Experiences”. Middle Eastern Studies; Vol 47. Pages 395 - 396.
 Ibid. Pages 397 - 398.52
H.N Malaeb (2015) “The “Kafala” System and Human Rights: Time for a Decision”. Arab Law Quarterly; 53
Brill. Pages 323.
 O. Chidiac (2014) “Migrant Construction and Domestic Workers in the Arab Gulf States: Modern-Day 54
Slaves?” L.L.M Theses. Page 14.
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consideration that not all countries apply this system consistently and that there are some 
exceptions. In the later years, almost all countries that apply the system have been making 
efforts to change Kafala to different extents, nonetheless this is a topic that will be detailed 
further in a later chapter of the paper. 
The first main characteristic of this system, which is shared by all the countries applying it, is 
that the migrant worker entry in the country must be tied to a specific employer, whose name 
would be stated in the entry visa, residence, and working permits. Using this definition, one 
can argue that there are other countries in the world that require a sponsor for migrants to be 
able to enter the host country and work in it. Also, entry visas are tied to a specific 
employment position instead of a person. However, the specificity in the countries that apply 
Kafala, is not only that the entry visa is bound to an individual employer, but also that the 
level of control that this employer can enforce towards the migrant is unmatched by other 
migration policies . 55
Moreover, all the countries that apply Kafala place the responsibility of renewing the 
residency permit of the migrant worker on the employer. Thus, the employer has the power to 
decide on the faith of the migrant worker. This characteristic is often exploited by the 
employers by threatening the worker of not renewing it if they do not agree to certain 
conditions that can be very abusive. Jordan is the exception to this rule, because their 
application of the system allows the migrant worker to renew the residency permit. To do so, 
though, the worker needs to hold a valid working permit that the employer has to issue . 56
When the employer fails to comply with this task, which happens quite often because it is a 
costly process, the migrant worker falls into an irregular status. Then, the migrant would be 
susceptible to detention and deportation, in addition to the payment of high fines. However, 
very few countries comprehend that the employer should be held accountable for the inaction. 
Another controversial characteristic of the Kafala system, which in this case is not shared by 
all the countries, is that approval of the employer is required to terminate the employment 
during the contract period. Similarly, changing employer also requires their consent. This 
characteristic does not apply to Qatar, and countries such as Bahrain, Kuwait and Jordan 
allow the migrant worker to terminate after one year of contract . This rule is in place to 57
protect the employer, who would have paid a significant amount of money to bring the 
migrant worker to the host country and issue all the required visas and permits, so the 
obligations of the employee are fulfilled as per the employer’s expectations. However, it 
presents several problems because when a migrant worker terminates a contract without the 
written consent of the employee, they would become irregular. This applies even in cases 
where the migrant worker faced violence, abuse, or exploitation. Thus, situations such as a 
 International Labor Organization (2017) “Employer-Migrant worker relationships in the Middle East: 55
Exploring scope for internal labor market mobility and fair migration”. Regional Office for Arab States; Beirut. 
Pages 6 - 11.
 International Labor Organization (2017) “Employer-Migrant worker relationships in the Middle East: 56
Exploring scope for internal labor market mobility and fair migration”. Regional Office for Arab States; Beirut. 
Pages 6 - 11.
 K. Robinson (2020) “What is the Kafala System?” Council of Foreign Relations. Available at: https://57
www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-kafala-system [Last consulted 2nd February 2021].
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migrant being imprisoned and deported because of reporting an abusive situation to the 
authorities after leaving the place or employment are not uncommon . In the past years, most 58
of the countries stopped the practice of requiring written consent from the employer for the 
migrant to leave the country. Currently, KSA, and in some cases Qatar, are the only countries 
that have such a requirement. However, an employer in the rest of countries still has several 
ways to challenge the exit of the migrant worker, by filing a false accusation of theft, for 
example, or by retaining the worker’s passport . 59
Finally, countries do not set an official minimum wage for migrant workers, because they 
often take jobs that are seen by the host society as inferior. This can lead to very miserable 
salaries that enhance the vulnerability position of the worker and their dependency on the 
employer. Nevertheless, countries like Kuwait, Lebanon, and Jordan, who informally set a 
minimum wage, have been highly criticized because the amount varies depending on the 
nationality of the worker. This practice is an example of racial discrimination among migrants 
by the host society, but the countries pardon themselves by saying that the minimum wage is 
settled after negotiations with the countries of origin. 
2.4 Kafala from the perspective of International Human Rights and International 
Labor Law 
The Kafala system has received several international criticisms on the basis that its 
application is against International Human Rights. In that sense, the system is considered by 
several researchers  and NGOs  as a form of human trafficking or modern day slavery. The 60
accusations of Kafala as a form of human trafficking are based on the assumption that the 
system procreates situations that comply with all the requirements that define human 
trafficking as per the UN Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, 
especially women and children in its article 3(a): 
“"Trafficking in persons" shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt 
of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of 
deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of 
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the 
purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution 
of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar 
to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs; ” 61
In that line, one can say that the sponsorship system applied in the GCC countries, Lebanon 
and, Jordan many times entitles the recruitment of workers through deception, since the 
information about work conditions, job positions, and rights as a worker in the host country 
that they receive are usually false. Other means of recruitment and transportation could also 
be met, but through the analysis of the personal stories of migrant domestic workers in 
 See for example: The New Humanitarian (2017) “Abused Migrant Workers End Up in Prison after trying to 58
Flee”. Available at: https://deeply.thenewhumanitarian.org/refugees/articles/2017/06/09/abused-migrant-
workers-end-up-in-prison-after-trying-to-flee-2 [Last consulted 13 March 2021]
 International Labor Organization (2017) “Employer-Migrant worker relationships in the Middle East: 59
Exploring scope for internal labor market mobility and fair migration”. Regional Office for Arab States; Beirut. 
Pages 6 - 11.
 Amnesty International; Human Rights watch, Migrant Forum in Asia…60
 A/RES/55/2561
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Lebanon, one can find the deception pattern highly repetitive. However, to be able to say that 
the Kafala system is a form of human trafficking the “purpose of exploitation” has to also be 
met. This fact is a bit more controversial. For some, domestic servitude is a form of 
exploitation, where migrants “are recruited and exploited in the performance of domestic 
tasks and services, mostly within a private household under physical or psychological threat 
or coercion ”. Thus, trafficking for domestic servitude would include the obligation to work 62
for a private individual, with low or no salary, no days off, psychological and/or physical 
violence, limited or restricted freedom of movement, and the lack of privacy . All or some of 63
these conditions are often met by migrant domestic workers employed under Kafala system. 
Nevertheless, for others, from the forms of exploitation that article 3(a) lists, one can not 
declare that these conditions constitute a form of human trafficking, even though they agree 
that these situations are wrong and a breach of human rights and labour standards: 
“Forced labour is different from sub-standard or exploitative working conditions. Various indicators 
can be used to ascertain when a situation amounts to forced labour, such as restrictions on workers’ 
freedom of movement, withholding of wages or identity documents, physical or sexual violence, 
threats and intimidation or fraudulent debt from which workers cannot escape. ” 64
Consent is one more particularity of the Kafala system that creates some controversy, since 
domestic workers do agree to be recruited and sign a contract in order to be employed in the 
host country. First of all, one needs to understand that in general, they do agree to sign a 
contract of which the conditions are untrue. This idea would be linked to deception. 
Moreover, from personal stories and practice, it is known that many migrant domestic 
workers sign a contract that they are not able to understand because it is not translated to their 
language. Even with those facts, for the defenders of the system, this consent would exempt 
the actors from any accusation. However, in the case of human trafficking, article 3(b) states 
that “The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth in 
subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in 
subparagraph (a) have been used ”. 65
In the eyes of the author, Kafala system can not be qualified as human trafficking 
systematically, but there is a higher risk of trafficking through deception, with the purpose of 
exploitation for migrant workers, including domestic workers, employed under it. Moreover, 
even if the definition of exploitation that would constitute human trafficking does not include 
low or unpaid salaries, no days off, no freedom of movement and other situations previously 
described, debt bondage would be considered a form of forced labor according to the ILO, 
 OSCE (2010) “Report of the Tenth Alliance against Trafficking in Persons Conference - Unprotected Work, 62
Invisible Exploitation: Trafficking for the Purpose of Domestic Servitude”. Occasional Paper Series no.4. Vienna 
17-18. Page 10.
 Ibid. Pages 9 - 11.63
 International Labour Organization (2021) “What is forced labour, modern slavery and human trafficking”. 64




CEI, Centro Adscrito a la Universitat de Barcelona  Nº 10/2021, 22 DE JUNIO DE2021 COLECCIÓN 
TRABAJOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN DEL M.U. EN DIPLOMACIA Y ORGANIZACIONES INTERNACIONALES
and thus a form of human trafficking . Debt bondage might not be one of the most 66
prominent consequences of the Kafala system, however, it happens more often that one 
thinks. In fact, it is quite common that the employers do not pay the migrant domestic workers 
for a flexible period of months, claiming that the worker owes them for paying their 
recruitment fees as well as their residency and working permits. 
It is important to highlight that the critics of the system acknowledge that those abusive 
situations do not exclusively occur at all instances when employing migrant workers through 
Kafala. However, the gaps in the system, mainly regarding workers’ protection, do facilitate 
the possibility for abuse. They would also argue that Kafala as a rule itself is not the source of 
violations of human rights and international labor standards. In their opinion, going back to 
the origins of the rule, this is the idea of a guarantee, and one can not understand that it 
originates such violations. In their opinion then, these violations are a consequence of 
unethical and abusive practices perpetrated by the actors of the system (sponsors, recruiters, 
mediators, brokers, etc.) taking advantage of the gaps that it presents . However, there are 67
other authors which consider that the system itself already allows such violations by putting 
the system in the hands and the complete will of the employer. 
Even if Kafala system can not be generally understood as human trafficking, there are many 
other criticisms that have to do with its violation of Human Rights and International Labour 
Standards. As per Human Rights documents, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
1948 (UDHR) sets the basis of the most internationally accepted Human Rights, since it is a 
fundamental constitutive document of the United Nations. It introduces principles such as 
equality, non discrimination or freedom of movement, which are not necessarily respected 
towards migrant domestic workers employed under the Kafala system. However, the UDHR 
does not have binding effects. 
Two other basic documents, which do have binding effects and that set the basis for the 
protection of human rights of all people are the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 1996  (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 68
Rights 1996  (ICESCR). In these documents one can find articles related to the prohibition of 69
slavery and forced labor, the right to liberty and security of person, the right to work, the right 
to the enjoyment of just and favorable conditions of work, the right to form trade unions, the 
right to social security, and the right to an adequate standard of living, between others to all 
people residing in the countries which are bound by them. Nonetheless, some of the countries 
applying Kafala did not ratify them. For example, the ICCPR was not ratified nor signed by 
 International Labour Organization (2021) “What is forced labour, modern slavery and human trafficking”. 66
Available at:https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/definition/lang--en/index.htm [Last visited 15 
February 2021].
 H.N Malaeb (2015) “The “Kafala” System and Human Rights: Time for a Decision”. Arab Law Quarterly; 67
Brill. Pages 317 to 321.
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and 68
accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 entry into force 23 March 1976
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Adopted and opened for signature, 69
ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 1966 entry into force 3 
January 1976
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KSA, UAE, and Oman. KSA and UAE also did not sign or ratify the ICESCR. This is due to 
the fact that these international documents on human rights appear to contradict certain 
principles of Islamic law, family laws, and customs concerning the equality between men and 
women and issues related to marriage and family . 70
Other International Human Rights treaties that tackle migrants and particularly migrant 
domestic workers as women are being violated by Kafala systematically. Those are the 
Convention against Racial Discrimination 1965  and the Convention on the Elimination of 71
All Forms of Discrimination against Women 1979 . Both documents have been signed and 72
ratified by all countries that apply the system. However, Kafala is not only an expression of 
discrimination against foreign workers and protection of the national identity, but an entity 
that exacerbates and procreates discrimination against migrant domestic workers, which are 
typically women. 
Finally, the Human Rights document that focuses in particular on the rights of migrant 
workers is the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families 1990 . This treaty’s main particularity is that the 73
rights and protections that it establishes apply to all migrant workers, with no discrimination 
in terms of their working period or their place of residence, covering even temporary workers 
such as workers employed under the Kafala system. This is of notorious importance, since 
temporary workers are usually much less protected - or not even included - in national labor 
laws and other labor protection mechanisms. Its goal then is to ensure that foreign workers 
would not be granted less rights than nationals . Unfortunately, this treaty has not been 74
signed nor ratified by any of the countries that employ migrant workers under Kafala system. 
Consequently, none of the protections granted by it would apply to them. However, one can 
observe that it has been ratified by most countries of origin especially in Asia, such as 
Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka. This is in contrast to Africa, where more and 
more foreign workers are migrating. However, the set of rights that this Convention provides 
to migrant workers completely opposes the idea of Kafala that was previously discussed. To 
be able to protect the society, values, and the culture of nationals, temporary workers must be 
easy to replace and integration must not be encouraged.  
On the other hand, Kafala also received many critiques because it is believed to violate 
several internationally accepted labor standards, which are mechanisms and rules established 
by the ILO that protect migrants in particular. The Convention concerning Migration for 
 H.N Malaeb (2015) “The “Kafala” System and Human Rights: Time for a Decision”. Arab Law Quarterly; 70
Brill. Pages 326 to 329.
 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Adopted and opened for 71
signature and ratification by General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965 entry into force 
January 1969
 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. New York, 18 December 197972
 UN General Assembly, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 73
Members of their Families, 18 December 1990, A/RES/45/158.
  H.N Malaeb (2015) “The “Kafala” System and Human Rights: Time for a Decision”. Arab Law Quarterly; 74
Brill. Page 328.
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Employment 1949  establishes rights and protections that, as it has been exposed, are not 75
being generally respected towards migrants employed under the Kafala system. Articles 2 and 
3 of this Convention insist on the duty of the members bound by it to provide accurate 
information regarding the migration process, as well as take appropriate steps against 
misleading propaganda regarding both emigration and immigration. Then, article 6 establishes 
that migrant workers that are lawfully in the territory of the host country, as are the ones 
employed under Kafala, should be granted a treatment no less favorable than the one applied 
to the nationals in terms of remuneration, hours of work, membership of trade unions, social 
security, etc. However, this document has been ratified by only 50 countries and none of them 
is a country were Kafala system is applied. 
The Convention on Migrant Workers 1975  concerning migrations in abusive conditions and 76
the promotion of equality of opportunity and treatment of migrant workers, sets already in its 
preamble the importance to work against the “existence of illicit and clandestine trafficking 
labour calls” and understanding that labour migration should happen through official 
agencies of employment. This document can have much impact on the work of recruitment 
agencies, both in the country of origin and the host country. Moreover, it can have an impact 
on the practice of “free visas” that puts many migrants in an irregular situation just upon 
arrival. Nevertheless, this document is also not broadly ratified, and once again none of the 
countries that apply Kafala has ratified it, neither most of the labour-sending countries. 
Most importantly, there is the ILO Convention that focuses particularly on domestic workers, 
which is the Convention concerning decent work for domestic workers from 2011 . This 77
document sets the basis of decent working conditions for domestic workers, that is the most 
vulnerable collective employed under Kafala and the obligation of ensuring that domestic 
workers are informed of their terms and conditions of employment in an appropriate manner. 
Moreover, this document also focuses on particularities applicable to migrant domestic 
workers, such as repatriation or workers recruited in one country to work in another country 
through contracts that are enforceable in the host countries. This Convention has been used in 
countries that apply the Kafala system to understand what should be the basis of protection 
and to propose possible alternatives to the system. However, none of the countries ratified it. 
Once again, these Conventions only bind the countries that ratified it, which are in none of the 
cases the countries that apply the Kafala. However, even in the Preamble of the Constitution 
of the ILO, the willingness of “protecting the interests of workers when employed in countries 
other than their own ” is established. Thus, as member states, the countries that apply the 78
system are acting against one of the goals that the organization aims to accomplish. 
In consequence, it can not be said that the Kafala system itself, as per the idea of guarantee, is 
against neither internationally established human rights or labor standards. Nevertheless, the 
 ILO CO97 - Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No.97)75
 ILO C143 - Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No.143)76
 ILO C189 - Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No.189).77
 ILO - Constitution of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), 1 April 191978
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gaps of the system, which in some countries is mainly consuetudinary, allow the breach of 
these rights and protections. Then, as it was exposed for the majority of cases, the countries 
that apply the system can not be held accountable for not ensuring such rights and protections 
to migrant workers, and in particular migrant domestic workers, since they are not bind by 
them. However, the conditions created by the gaps allow certain employers to take advantage 
and mistreat their employers and are against universal human rights. Moreover, the countries 
that apply Kafala, even if they are not bind by certain specific treaties, are member states of 
the ILO, so they should pursue and ensure the accomplishment of its most fundamental 
principles by granting protection to all workers in their territories. 
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3. KAFALA SYSTEM IN LEBANON 
In this chapter, the Kafala system is examined in the context of Lebanon and its effects are 
particularly discussed for the cases of the female migrant domestic workers. The real 
experiences of migrant domestic workers that are collected in this paper are not isolated cases 
or scenarios that do not happen similarly in other countries where the system is applied. In 
particular, Lebanon applies Kafala as the rule that regulates low skilled workers from Asia 
and Africa, but it does not apply to the numerous migrant workers coming from Syria, for 
example . Since October 2019, Lebanon has been facing an economic and financial crisis, 7980
whose consequences were deeply aggravated by the COVID-19 global pandemic and the 
explosion on the 4th of August 2020. All of these events have obviously impacted the lives 
and livelihoods of migrant domestic workers in the country, as it is being reflected on the 
personal stories shared in this paper. Although the events that have lead to these experiences 
are not found in other countries  that apply the Kafala, they are not the culprits behind their 81
poor conditions, rather an exacerbating factor. The situation of migrant workers has been 
objectionable at many levels since the migration waves started to arrive to the countries that 
apply Kafala, and the events in Lebanon had given them a great hardship but also more 
visibility. 
3.1 Domestic work in Lebanon  
Domestic work is, according to ILO, one of the lowest-paid occupations in the labor market 
around the world . This is due to the fact that domestic work is not a commodity-producing 82
activity, and traditionally all quantification of national income would be entirely based on that 
kind of activities. Thus, labor that would happen in the framework of the household would be 
systematically undermined, since it is deemed not to produce a surplus. Moreover, this needs 
to be linked to the patriarchal idea that “men are the breadwinners” and on the contrary, 
women, who perform the house labor are classified as dependent. In addition, one has to 
consider race and power relations on top of patriarchal and capitalist influence to explain the 
fact of the depreciation of domestic labor . On that note, domestic work is the category of 83
employment that most attract female foreign workers in Lebanon, sometimes well-educated 
migrants, due to mainly two factors. One would be the possibility of higher wages paid in 
dollars, and the other would be the inability to easily access other kinds of jobs due to the 
legislation of the country, which is a reflection of a deeply racist and national protective 
society. 
 Syrian workers enjoy greater cross-border movement with Lebanon. Nonetheless, Syrians mainly work in the 79
informal sector.
 A. Khan & H. Harroff-Travel (2011) “ Reforming the Kafala: Challenges and opportunities moving forward” . 80
Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, Vol. 20, Nos. 3-4. Pages 293 - 295.
 Rather others, see for example: Amnesty International (2016) “The ugly side of the beautiful game: 81
exploitation of migrant workers on a Qatar 2022 World Cup site.” Doha, Qatar.
 International Labour Organization (2015) “Domestic work, wages and gender equality: lessons from 82
developing countries”. Working paper No.5/2015. Pages 11 - 17.
 N. Hasan (2017) “Serving Class and Capital: The Political Economy of Migrant Domestic Work in Lebanon”. 83
University of London. Pages 8 - 9.
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Historically, domestic work in Lebanon was formed by Lebanese and Kurdish women and 
girls from poor backgrounds and rural areas. Lebanese women employed in domestic work 
were mainly Shia  that would be original from the rural area of Baalbek. Kurdish refugee 84
women were employed for domestic work since 1920 and the term Kurdiyeh became a 
euphemism for “domestic worker” in Lebanon . To a certain extent, also Syrian, Palestinian 85
and Egyptian women and girls from refugee camps in Lebanon would be part of this 
workforce. They would start working in the households from a young age and mainly stay 
until the age of getting married, hence the domestic worker would grow into adulthood in the 
house of the employer, who was known by the worker’s family and who had a duty of care 
towards the worker . 86
However, during the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990) and after it, the political tensions 
between  all religious sects and factions acted as a factor to push for change in domestic work. 
Lebanese started preferring non-Arab women for domestic work because they did not want to 
bring those tensions into their household . In parallel, Lebanon started emerging as a 87
migration “receiving country”, in particular after the end of the war, but migration waves from 
Asia and Africa started to happen in the 1970s. This was due to the fact that during the war 
many Lebanese left the country voluntarily or compulsory, but once the war ended and left 
place to more stability, Lebanon offered job opportunities again, mainly involving manual 
labor. These gaps in the labor market were not filled by the displaced Lebanese, who were 
reluctant about returning and were not very attracted to those kinds of jobs. Thus, it opened 
the market for foreign migrant workers, both Arab and non-Arab . This immigration trend 88
grew in the post-war 1990s period, with the overall growth of the country, and accelerated 
exponentially in the 2000 - 2010 period . 89
Moreover, the replacement of Arab women for domestic work had to do with the fact that 
foreign domestic work was cheaper, since they were paid lower wages, and the fact that 
Lebanese domestic workers would not accept to live-in with their employers. They would not 
work the same amount of hours. But also since they were much easier to replace due to their 
regulation through Kafala contracts, which allowed the employer to return and exchange the 
employee in the recruitment agency during the first three months of contract or once the 
 Muslims of the branch of Islam comprising sects believing in Ali and the Imams as the only rightful successors 84
of Muhammad and in the concealment and messianic return of the last recognized Imam. In Lebanon most of 
them live in the northern and western area of the Bekaa Valley, Southern Lebanon and Beirut, being the largest 
Muslim denomination in the country.
 Waves of Kurdish refugees arrived in Lebanon between 1925-1959 fleeing violence and poverty in Turkey and 85
later also from Syria.
 R. Jureidini (2002) “Women Migrant Domestic Workers in Lebanon”. Gulf Labour Markets and Migration. 86
Pages 8 - 11
 Ibid 87
 P. Tabar (2010) “Lebanon: A country of Emigration and Immigration”. Institute for Migration Studies. Pages 9 88
- 14.
 International Labour Organization (2015) “Towards Decent Work in Lebanon: Issues and Challenges in Light 89
of the Syrian Refugee Crisis”. Regional Office for Arab States. Pages 16 - 17. 
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contract was over, after two or three years, repatriating her to her country of origin. Following 
the trend of increasing demand of foreign work, the first recruitment agency opened in 
Lebanon in 1978, importing cheap domestic work from Sri Lanka . Then, due to the high 90
number of domestic workers from that nationality, the euphemisms to describe domestic work 
in the country shifted to Srilankiyeh. Simultaneously, the Lebanese society started to associate 
domestic work to a lower status, thus degrading Arab women. With the proliferation of 
migrant domestic work and recruitment agencies in the 1990s, domestic work has been linked 
not only to the status, but most importantly to race .  91
At a first stage, domestic workforce in Lebanon was composed mainly by Sri Lanka and the 
Philippines nationals. However, with time, other Asian nationalities such as Bangladeshi or 
Nepali started arriving to the country. This was followed by a wave of immigration from 
African countries, mainly Ethiopia, but also from Cameroon, Nigeria, Kenya, Sierra Leone, 
Ghana, Madagascar, Togo, Cambodia, Uganda, Tanzania, and Burkina Faso. Since the 1990s, 
some of the countries of origin such as the Philippines and Sri Lanka marketed the export of 
cheap domestic labour, attracted by the remittances which presented an exponential source of 
income for the countries of origin . Nevertheless, other countries such as Ethiopia or 92
Bangladesh banned their female nationals from traveling to the Gulf countries, Lebanon, and 
Jordan as a consequence of the stories of exploitation and abuse, and the lack of will from the 
governments of the receiving countries to control it . Despite this fact, in the past years, 93
Ethiopians have reached the majority of migrant domestic workers in the country according to 
data from Lebanon’s Ministry of Labor. A total of 144,986 Ethiopian domestic workers  out of 
a total estimated 250,000  migrant domestic workers processed new work permits or renewed 94
them as of November 2018 . This number does not take into consideration any of the 9596
migrant domestic workers who are in an irregular situation, either because of an irregular 
entry, entry with a tourist visa or because they overstayed their residency permit. 
Consequently, in reality these numbers are higher, but there are no official estimations. This is 
explained by the fact that no national population census has been officially taken in Lebanon 
 R. Jureidini (2002) “Women Migrant Domestic Workers in Lebanon.” Gulf Labour Markets and Migration. 90
Pages 8 - 11
 International Labour Organization (2004) “Gender and Migration in Arab States: The case of Domestic 91
Workers”. Regional Office for the Arab States, Beirut. Pages 63 to 85.
 P. Tabar (2010) “Lebanon: A country of Emigration and Immigration”. Institute for Migration Studies. Pages 9 92
- 14.
 R. Jureidini (2002) “Women Migrant Domestic Workers in Lebanon”. Gulf Labour Markets and Migration. 93
Pages 8 - 11
 Human Rights Watch (2020) “Lebanon: Blow to Migrant Domestic Worker Right”  Available at: https://94
www.hrw.org/news/2020/10/30/lebanon-blow-migrant-domestic-worker-rights [Last visited 10th March 2021]
 Amnesty International (2020) “Lebanon: Abandoned migrant domestic workers must be protected” Available 95
at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/06/lebanon-abandoned-migrant-domestic-workers-must-be-
protected/ [Last visited 10 March 2021]
 Ethiopians kept entering the country illegally until 2018 when the ban was lifted. Either with the assistance of 96
recruitment agencies and arriving to Lebanon through tourist visas for the period of three months, to be 
exchanged for a working permit under the Kafala contract rules after that period. Either, a significantly reduced 
proportion, entered Lebanon illegally through very dangerous migration paths crossing Yemen and risking their 
life in a boat across the Gulf of Aden.
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since 1932, due to the power distribution concerns in the country. A new census would 
threaten the current structure of sectarian power-sharing, which currently and based in the last 
census gives Christians and Muslims equal representation in the parliament . 97
Even though Lebanon is a country of emigration and immigration, this fact has not been a 
main concern for the Lebanese government and policy makers. As a multi-confessional 
republic with nearly 7 million inhabitants, the country has struggled for many years with 
human loss, brain drain consequences of the socioeconomic hardship, and political chaos due 
to the sectarian structure and military conflicts. Moreover, the country has been receiving an 
important influx of refugees and asylum seekers that are often seen as a burden by the 
Lebanese society. Despite all that the country still lacks a public migration policy and 
legislation regarding migration flows . This also explains the fact that regarding domestic 98
work, the Lebanese government did not play a major role in regulating it and private 
recruitment agencies both in the countries of origin and in Lebanon are the ones who have 
been managing the important waves of foreign migration that is employed in the sector. 
Therefore, there are no specific laws that ensure the protection of migrant workers’ rights in 
Lebanon. In particular, migrant domestic workers are excluded from the Lebanese labour 
law  by its Article 7 . Thus, they are denied from all protections and benefits that are 99 100
ensured to Lebanese nationals and other non-Lebanese. These protections include a minimum 
wage, overtime pay, compensation for unfair dismissal, social security and parental leave. 
However, there is certain legal framework that regulates labor migration in Lebanon, 
regarding their entry, stay and exit from the country. According to these laws  , non-101 102
Lebanese seeking work in Lebanon must obtain, prior entry to the country, an approval from 
the Ministry of Labor. 
3.2 Practices under Kafala system in Lebanon 
Kafala in Lebanon is mainly a system based on customary practice, meaning that there is no 
codified law establishing what this system covers, which exponentially increases gaps on 
protection for both parts. However, due to the position of power that the employers hold in 
these cases, they might be tempted to resort to certain practices that are unlawful to protect 
 P. Tabar (2010) “Lebanon: A country of Emigration and Immigration”. Institute for Migration Studies. Pages 9 97
- 14.
 European Training Foundation (2017) “Migrant support measures from an employment and skills perspective 98
(MISMES)” Beirut, Lebanon. Pages 6 - 7.
 The Lebanese Code of Labour; Law of 23 September 1946 (including modifications) - English translation. 99
A v a i l a b l e a t : h t t p s : / / w w w . i l o . o r g / d y n / t r a v a i l / d o c s / 7 1 0 /
Labour%20Code%20of%2023%20September%201946%20as%20amended.Publication%202010.pdf [Last 
consulted :10th March 2021]
 Article 7; Lebanese Code of Labour; Law of 23 September 1946 (including modifications): 100
“Are exempted from the present law: 
1 - Domestic servants employed in private houses; 
(…)”
 1962 Law Regulating the Entry of Foreigners into Lebanon, Their Stay and Their Exit from Lebanon. 101
Available at: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/SERIAL/39235/97114/F1425814770/LBN-39235.pdf [Last 
consulted 10th March 2021]
 1964 By-Law No 17561 Regulating the Work of Aliens. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/102
SERIAL/39241/97116/F1805533883/LBN-39241.pdf [Last consulted: 10th March 2021]
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their own interest. Moreover, Kafala, being a customary system, can also lead to higher risk 
of misunderstanding related to its content, which can also cause unlawful practices by both 
parts since expectations from this labor relationship tend to not be defined. These practices are 
not allowed by the Kafala system per se, rather a consequence of it, are being exposed 
through previous studies in the country and the testimonies of the migrant workers 
interviewed by the author for this purpose. One must take into consideration that the 
situations described in this section are related to migrant domestic workers employed under 
Kafala, thus living in the house of their employers. 
It is common practice that the migrant domestic worker signs a contract that she can not 
understand, since the contract that official recruitment agencies should be using to regulate 
the relationship between the employer and the employee is only available in English and 
Arabic, two languages, which even if some of the foreign workers are able to speak, might not 
be able to be read. Moreover, in the majority of cases, the employees do not have access to a 
copy of the contract that should be facilitated by the recruitment agencies . Thus, it is 103
difficult for them to know what are their rights and duties under their employment 
relationship. This would be even more difficult when they want to prove to their employer 
that a part of this contract is being breached. Employers also tend to have misinformation 
about the contract and the rights and duties of both parts . All of the migrant workers 104
interviewed stated that they arrived to Lebanon under a contract. However, the majority did 
not know what was established on it and stated feeling deceived as per their expectations prior 
to their arrival to the country. 
Another unlawful practice is to restrict the mobility of the worker, mainly by locking the 
employee inside the house or by not letting them out of the house without expressly given 
permission. Employers might follow this practice as a means to “secure their investment”. 
This also means that they ensure that the migrant domestic worker will not leave the house to 
become a freelancer without fulfilling her duties under the contract. Thus, when a migrant 
worker leaves the house without permission, the employer would inform the authorities that 
she is a “runaway”, so they are not held accountable for her actions as her kafeels. In 
particular, regarding locking the worker inside the house, some employers would justify the 
practice by saying that it is a way to protect the worker from strangers and buglers, or to 
protect themselves from the dishonor of the worker inviting men to their home . Moreover, 105
in the same way, employers might restrict the communication means of the worker by not 
allowing her to have contact with people outside the house or by supervising, limiting, or 
completely restricting her communication with her family back in her country of origin . 106
 International Labour Organization (2016) “Intertwined: A study of Employers of Migrant Domestic Workers 103
in Lebanon”. International Labour Office, Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work; Labour Migration 
Branch. Geneva. Pages 22 - 40.
 Ibid 104
 International Labour Organization (2016) “Intertwined: A study of Employers of Migrant Domestic Workers 105
in Lebanon”. International Labour Office, Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work; Labour Migration 
Branch. Geneva. Pages 22 - 40.
 Amnesty International (2019) “Their house is my prison: Exploitation of migrant domestic workers in 106
Lebanon”. London. Page 19.
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Both these practices have important consequences on the worker’s availability to identify and 
report abusive practices against her.  
To protect their investment and on the grounds that it is the responsibility of the employer to 
renew the residency and working permits of the worker, employers tend to confiscate 
passports and documentation of the domestic worker . Despite this practice is expressly 107
prohibited by Lebanese law, mechanisms are not in place to prevent it. In consequence, this 
practice has been encouraged by recruitment agencies to the point that upon their arrival to the 
country and when domestic workers meet their employers for the first time, General Security 
hands the passport directly to the employer . Without these documents in her power, if the 108
worker runs away or gets fired, she does not only become irregular but also undocumented, 
thus arrested and imprisoned if caught by the General Security. In the current context, it made 
it much more challenging for the migrant domestic workers that wanted to return to their 
home country. 
There are also common malpractices regarding the payment of the salary. According to the 
aforementioned contract, the employer should pay the salary at the end of every month. 
However, delays in the payment are not uncommon. Some employers pay the salary every 
few months and others when the worker asks for it . Due to the current situation, some 109
employers have been facing difficulties to pay the salaries of their employees on time, so the 
delay in the payments has exacerbated since October 2019. Moreover, even though the salary 
was typically specified in dollars in the contract, because of the dollar shortage salaries are 
being paid mainly in Lebanese pound, which not only reduces exponentially the worker’s 
purchasing power, but their capacity to send remittances to their families, which for most is 
the main reason to be employed abroad. However, another unlawful practice is to retain the 
salary of the worker for the first months to repay for the employer’s investment. Regarding 
the quantity of the salary, it is stipulated at the notary public -as an official agreement between 
the parts of the contract- or by the recruitment agency, since the aforementioned contract has a 
blank space to be filled. One must take in consideration that since domestic work is not 
included in the Lebanese labor law, there is no minimum wage established . As it was 110
mentioned before, there is a racial component that affects the quantity of the salary. Thus, 
even though the contract is the same for migrant workers of all nationalities, meaning that all 
of them are supposed to have similar working conditions, the salary is defined by their 
nationality. Accordingly, Filipinas, who are believed to be cleaner, more educated, and speak 
English, tend to have salaries around $300 per month, whereas Ethiopians, Sri Lankans and 
Bangladeshis, who are believed to be less educated and have little to no experience with 
 94,3 percent of 1,200 employers surveyed the ILO (2016) “Intertwined: A study of Employers of Migrant 107
Domestic Workers in Lebanon”. International Labour Office, Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work; 
Labour Migration Branch. Geneva. Pages 36.
 Amnesty International (2019) “Their house is my prison: Exploitation of migrant domestic workers in 108
Lebanon”. London. Page 18.
 International Labour Organization (2016) “Intertwined: A study of Employers of Migrant Domestic Workers 109
in Lebanon”. International Labour Office, Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work; Labour Migration 
Branch. Geneva. Pages 22 - 40.
 The minimum wage is set at 450$ per month, however due to the current situation, nationals are getting paid 110
now in the local currency.
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household electrical appliances, have salaries of around $200 per month that can increase 
yearly depending on the will of the employer . The majority of migrant workers interviewed 111
explained how they were deceived by the quantity of their salary. At the recruitment agencies 
back in their countries of origin, the salaries promised would be higher for less demanding 
work or better working conditions. Moreover, almost half of the interviewed women were 
deprived of their salaries for the first months of work, on the grounds that the employer made 
a big disbursement for their residency and working papers, ticket and insurance. 
Regarding the working conditions, the contract stipulates that the working hours should be a 
maximum of ten, that the employer should not employ the worker in more than one place, and 
that a day-off per week should be granted to the worker. However, these conditions are not 
often fulfilled . Workers can be asked to work from very early until very late continuously 112
without an extra pay, and not being granted 8 hours of uninterrupted sleep because taking care 
of small children or elderly at night is among their duties. Moreover, they can also be asked to 
work in the household and workplace of the employer or in relatives’ household with no extra 
payment and thus prolongating their working hours. As it has been explained, their day-off 
might not be granted when the employer fears that the employee would run away. At the same 
time, restrictions on the workers access to healthcare seem to be a common practice, even 
though the employer is supposed to provide the worker with a medical insurance under the 
contract . 113
Migrant domestic workers are expected to live in their employer’s house, who should provide 
them with food, clothing and accommodation that respects her dignity and privacy according 
to the aforementioned contract. However, this is not always the case. Domestic workers can 
be deprived of food by their employers, by limiting their amount or by not allowing them to 
cook meals that are culturally appropriate for them. In particular, regarding accommodation, 
Lebanese households have been mainly designed with spaces such as attics or small rooms for 
the domestic workers. Others are not granted a private space and they sleep in common areas 
such as the living room, kitchen, balcony or with the children of the employer .  114
It is evident how malpractices are performed by individual employers, but also by the 
recruitment agencies. Recruitment agencies are highly unregulated under Lebanese law, and 
they assume the role of linking the employer with a potential migrant worker according to 
previously specified requirements and facilitating the migration process . However, due to 115
their unregulated nature, there are some abusive practices like the ones discussed that are not 
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isolated events . Recruitment agencies seem to perpetrate violence and threats against 116
migrant domestic workers, when the workers are returned by the employer due to 
“misbehaviors” like asking for their basic rights or trying to run away from an exploitative 
household . Moreover, recruitment agencies in some countries of origin are known to 117
demand the migrant workers to pay certain amounts for the facilitation of their documents and 
traveling ticket. This can leave the migrants at a debt situation and thus extremely vulnerable, 
even before her arrival to Lebanon. Some of them send their lands, houses and businesses or 
ask for loans to be able to cover for these unlawful costs, which puts them in a very 
vulnerable situation since the beginning of their journey and sometimes, when unable to pay 
back their debt, it stands as one more challenge for their repatriation. 
3.3 The Lebanese current context in regards of Kafala 
Since October 2019, Lebanon has been experiencing several political and economical 
challenges. Back then, the Lebanese cabinet announced a new pack of taxes, including a tax 
on WhatsApp calls, tobacco and petrol to address the loss of value of the Lebanese pound and 
inflation. Consequently, the Lebanese people across all the country peacefully protested 
against those taxes and demanded a change in the cabinet, with the aim to end corruption and 
gain accountability, many of which advocated for the end of the sectarian system. Moreover, 
the Lebanese people joined efforts to demand basic social and economic rights . Even 118
though the cabinet resigned and a new Prime Minister was appointed, this did not satisfy the 
Lebanese people that saw how the figures that have been holding power in the country for 
decades managed to remain and how the country is still going through a free fall in economy 
due to the situation of the local currency. Since 1997, the exchange rate of the dollar was fixed 
at 1 dollar to 1,507 Lebanese pounds . However, in the past year the local currency has lost 119
more than 80% of its value, and the exchange rate in the black market hit the highest rate on 
Wednesday 17th of March 2021 reaching the 15,000 Lebanese pounds. The unprecedented 
inflation rate translates in more than 50% of the population below the poverty line  and the 120
disappearance of the middle class, who is becoming poorer due to the restrictions on their 
withdrawal of dollars that are already very scarce in the country and the loss of their savings 
to a currency that is extremely devaluated. Furthermore, the discontent and desperation of the 
Lebanese society keeps growing as the unemployment rate exceeds 30%, the annual food 
inflation gets around 190%, and food availability is jeopardized . Additionally, the economic 121
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situation has resulted on fuel shortages and power cuts that in some areas exceeded 20 hours 
per day and affected basic service providers such as hospitals. The COVID-19 global 
pandemic has also contributed in worsening the socioeconomic crisis that the country is 
facing. The government declared the state of emergency mid-March 2020, after the first case 
of COVID-19 was reported on the 21st of February 2020 . Since then, strict periods of self-122
quarantine have been imposed, requiring all non-essential public and private institutions to 
remain closed for long periods of time . Due to the financial impact of closure, which 123
increased unemployment and underemployment and kept aggravating the socioeconomic 
crisis, the strict lockdown situation is not easy to be maintained. The Lebanese fear that the 
poverty and a possible famine would kill more than the virus . Yet, Lebanon and its people 124
had to face one more tragedy on the 4th of August 2020, when an explosion in the port of 
Beirut killed 190 people, injured more than 6,500 and destroyed the infrastructure for several 
miles out along the path, which is estimated to be around $15 billion in direct damage . The 125
explosion also left more than 300,000 people homeless, affected nine major hospitals and 
damaged the source of income for many. Moreover, the blast affected the imports of food in a 
country that relies on imports to feed its people, since 90% of the imports of food entered the 
country by the port typically . 126
Migrant domestic workers, as one of the most vulnerable collectives in Lebanon, have been 
experiencing even more challenges due to the consequences of the aforementioned situation. 
Freelancer migrant domestic workers have been struggling with unemployment since the 
beginning of the crisis, whereas migrant domestic workers under a contract have been 
experiencing delay or non-payment of wages and especially around June 2020, when more 
cases of abandonment of workers occurred before the termination of the contract. Many 
employers, unable to fulfill their duties towards the worker anymore, started leaving the 
workers in front of their embassies with their little belongings and unpaid wages . That 127
situation got especially critical when the airport closed because of the COVID-19 preventions 
in mid-March 2020, when only very expensive repatriation flights were allowed to their 
countries of origin. Among the employers’ obligations under the contract, there is the duty of 
paying for a repatriation ticket when terminating the contract, but this was not being 
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fulfilled . And it got even worse with the Beirut Blast that affected many places of 128
employment of migrant domestic workers and left others homeless. Moreover, undocumented 
migrant domestic workers suffered the most from the COVID-19 pandemic, since they were 
denied access to Polymerase-Chain Reaction tests and hospitals. They are currently not being 
able to register themselves to take the vaccine even though the government is working on a 
plan to amend that fact . Plus it also increased the price of repatriation, since many countries 129
imposed an amount of days of quarantine that the migrant had to cover. In addition, the 
situation in the country increased tensions and xenophobia, especially when these groups 
receive aid. This is why, in general, self-organized community migrant groups tend to help 
each other and provide a quicker response when migrants are in need of food, shelter or 
medical needs. 
3.4 Testimonies 
This section presents real stories of three migrant domestic workers in Lebanon, interviewed 
by the author. Despite these testimonies being qualitative in nature, they represent samples of 
the impact that the Kafala system can have on their lives. These testimonies not only show the 
reality that live-in migrant domestic workers face, but most importantly it highlights that their 
struggle would continue if they manage to run away from an abusive employer’s household. 
These three testimonies were selected because they reflect most of the scenarios that have 
been presented along this paper. Through them one should acknowledge that there is real 
people behind all the exploitation and abuses that Kafala facilitates. Migrant domestic 
workers that by being employed under a Kafala contract are deprived of their most basic 
rights and dignity. In addition, the fact that these migrants shared their stories between the 
period of January 2021 and March 2021, also disclosures their vision on the current crisis 
situation, and the impact that it has in their migration process. 
The story of Mimi 
“Mimi” first arrived to Lebanon from Ethiopia in 2011, when she was only 18 years old. 
Back then, she only wished to work to be able to support her family. However, now she 
denounces that no one explained to her the reality of working in Lebanon. Looking back, she 
feels that she was not only deceived by the people who recruited her back in Ethiopia, lied 
about the working conditions, and misled her about the salary, but also about how the 
Lebanese society would accommodate her. She felt deceived by her family, who pushed her to 
travel to Lebanon so she could support them while she being left without anything in a 
country that was so strange to her.  
When she first arrived, she was young and did not know much about Lebanon or about her 
rights, but she felt that what they were doing to her was wrong. After six months she 
complained to her employers, stating the unfairness of not receiving her salary directly, since 
it was being automatically transferred to her family. Moreover, she complained about the fact 
that she was not granted days off, that she was working many hours from very early in the 
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morning until very late at night, and that communication with her family was being limited. 
The employers, far from acknowledging their malpractice towards Mimi and start granting her 
better conditions were rather displeased by her complains. For this reason, they decided to 
“return her” to the recruitment agency stating that she was no longer welcomed in their house. 
The recruiters hit her repeatedly because of her misbehavior, which was costing them their 
business reputation. They could not allow her to complain or to demand anything from any 
future employers. Not long after that, they found someone else who wanted to employ her. 
However, Mimi was traumatized by her previous experience and did not want to be treated 
poorly anymore, so during the first week she left the house were she was supposed to be 
employed. 
She has been working as a freelance for nine years now, procuring herself with shelter and 
food. In Lebanon, she met her husband, who was a migrant worker from Sudan. They were 
both working when they had their first baby, but a couple of years later, Mimi found herself 
pregnant again in a country that did not offer her opportunities anymore. Both her and her 
husband are unemployed and being sheltered with their baby at a friend’s house, where five 
other people were also living, due their inability to pay rent. They have to rely on food 
donations and diaper donations from NGOs to cover for these basic needs. 
The story of Lily 
“Lily” is from Nairobi, Kenya and she is 27 years old. She holds a certificate from a course 
on beauty and hairdressing that she completed in her home country. Thus, when she learnt that 
she could work on something related to that in Lebanon, as the recruitment agency told her, 
she decided to leave, motivated by the opportunity of making more money and gaining 
independence. However, upon her arrival in Lebanon back in 2014, she discovered that she 
was recruited for domestic work. She wanted to return to her home country that same 
moment, she did not want to leave the airport. But her employer told her that there was no 
choice for her but stay and work, since they had paid for her and she actually owed them 
money. That same reasoning was applied when they refused to give her the first two months 
of salary. 
After four months working for her employer, “Lily” was very deceived from the whole 
situation. Her work in Lebanon was not at all what she was promised back in Kenya, thus she 
went back to her recruitment agency and asked them to look for another employer for her. 
The second employer was a man who was single. He expressed from the first day that he did 
not only want her to work, but also to maintain sexual relations with him. “Lily” was afraid 
and disgusted by the idea, so she decided to leave, even though that meant falling into an 
irregular situation and losing her passport. After hearing stories from other migrant workers 
she met, she felt she was not unlucky with the first employer. They did retain her salary for 
the first two months but she was not being abused or held captive. 
However, she finds life as a freelance very hard, especially with the current situation because 
job opportunities are scarce and prices are on rise. At the beginning, she struggled to find a 
place to stay that she could afford and slept in the street for a week. But then, she met a 
Sudanese man that offered to shelter her. They lived together for a while, married and had a 
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baby that to this date does not have any legal documentation, so they can not travel back to 
their country. Moreover, her husband had a work accident and he had to go back to Sudan, 
leaving her and her baby behind unable to support themselves. She has been facing threats of 
eviction and needs to resort to NGOs to cover her baby’s and her basic needs. 
The story of Mary 
“Mary” is a 24 year old Sierra Leonian woman from the city of Freetown. She came to 
Lebanon for the first time in 2018 and remembers the day that all her dreams about migrating 
to a foreign country transformed into an ugly reality. She decided to come to Lebanon after 
being approached by a recruitment agency back in Sierra Leone. They told her that traveling 
was a great opportunity, were she could make a lot of money working in a job of her choice. 
She was very interested on working in a restaurant, or in a supermarket. But domestic work 
was never on the table.  
When she first arrived and discovered that she was recruited to work as a maid in a private 
household, she felt very angry. She refused to do so, but they threatened her and told her there 
was no other choice and that she needed to accept it. She felt even more tricked when she did 
not receive her salary for the first four months of work, after her employer told her that they 
did not have the money to pay her, since recruiting her was already very expensive. She was 
also denied any days off and the employers did not provide her with enough food. She felt 
very tired after long hours of work everyday, but she did not even have a place to rest 
properly. Her employer made her sleep on the floor of the kitchen and she was not granted 
any privacy. Four months passed under these conditions, but then she refused to work 
anymore. She told her employer that she was not to going to accept that treatment. 
Consequently, the employer “returned” her to the recruitment agency. There, they found her 
another employer. “Mary” felt grateful that now her situation was better, was at least receiving 
her salary, and was not starved anymore. However, because of the socioeconomic crisis and 
after the explosion, her employer informed her that they were not able to pay her anymore and 
asked the recruitment agency to reallocate her. But the recruitment agency could not find 
anyone to employ “Mary”, neither could they grant her a shelter. 
She found herself homeless and jobless in a strange country. After a few days, other Sierra 
Leonian workers sheltered her in their flat, but she has been struggling to find freelance work 
to collaborate on the expenses of the house she shares. She is clear she wants to stay in 
Lebanon and hopes the situation will get better because she does not have a family to return to 
and she did not finish paying the debt she has in her home country, as a result of a loan she 
asked for to travel to Lebanon. However, she wishes to start legal actions against the 
recruitment agency back in her home country, for the lies they told her and the misery they 
brought into her life. 
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4. WAYS FORWARD 
Kafala system was put in place in the GCC countries, Lebanon and Jordan to regulate foreign 
workers. It reduces the role of the government by linking the migrant to the kafeel, usually the 
employer, who would take responsibility for the worker and subordinate the residency status 
on their employment. However, it does not mean that the government does not have a role at 
all. It is important to understand that Lebanon and the GCC countries -but not Jordan- decided 
to involve the Ministry of Interior on the management of foreign work. Thus, by doing so and 
not involving the Ministry of Labor, national labor law is not applicable to migrant workers. 
In consequence, none of the protections that the law ensures to nationals is guaranteed to 
migrant workers . In this section, the main criticism against Kafala is discussed with the 130
steps taken by the applying countries to amend this situation at a certain extent. The case of 
Lebanon is examined in detail, in particular the factors that pushed for reforms recently and 
how these reforms, namely the Standard Unified Contract, were not materialized and why. 
4.1 Pushing for reforms in the region 
As it has been mentioned, there has been wide international criticism against Kafala. Not only 
in the sense of the consequences that it has on the treatment of migrant workers and how it 
clashes with international human rights and labour standards, but also, it has been criticized 
for its effects on the domestic labor markets . Regarding its effects on the labor market, 131
reforming the system would mean potential benefits for the internal labour market mobility of 
the GCC countries, Lebanon, and Jordan. It would support national employment strategies by 
reducing the rights and wages gaps between nationals and migrants, thus more nationals 
would be attracted to fields of work that only target migrants, and there will not be a gain for 
the employers when employing migrants, because their salaries would be the same as 
nationals. It would also stand as incentive for businesses and workers, since the reputation of 
the countries would improve in terms of labour standards and it would make it easier for 
international investors to open businesses and hire foreign workforce if needed. Moreover, 
facilitating mobility in the labor market for foreign workers would result in a better coverage 
of the needs of the employers, and it would also facilitate the stay of foreign workers and 
eliminate the huge cost of recruitment from the country of origin. All of these economic 
improvements that could happen if the Kafala system was dismantled or reformed, would 
mean an upgrade and diversification of the economies in the region . For these reasons, in 132
the past years, governments of the countries that apply Kafala have been announcing their 
will to reform or even abolish the system. However, it can be said that the steps that have been 
taken by the majority of the governments were more in the sense of small improvements in 
regards to the working and living conditions of foreign workers, rather than reforming the 
system structurally or getting close to abolishing it. In this sense, the initiatives that have been 
taken until the moment have been mainly addressing labour market mobility and the most 
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exploitative and abusive elements of the system. However, these reforms seem to consistently 
exclude migrant domestic workers . 133
Bahrain is one of the countries that announced in 2009 that the country would dismantle the 
Kafala system, and that the government would be the one responsible for sponsoring 
migrants, instead of an individual sponsor, through the government lead “Labour Market 
Regulatory Authority” (LMRA), which originally regulated the work process and post-
recruitment phase . Nonetheless, this reform did not materialize entirely and, in practice, the 134
migrant workers still need the approval of the individual kafeel to enter the country. The same 
year, Bahrain issued the “Decision No.79 for 2009 Regarding the mobility of foreign 
employee from one employer to another ”, which was supposed to eliminate the need of the 135
employer authorization  to change the place of employment and stand as a burden to the 136
protracted exploitative and abusive labor relationships. However, in 2011 the government 
retracted and stipulated that foreign workers would need the employer’s authorization to 
change employers during the first 12 months of employment, and migrant domestic workers 
would need the authorization during the full duration of their contract period . In 2016, ten 137
years after the first step towards abolishing Kafala in Bahrain , the government 138
acknowledged the lengthy process of dismantling the system and the failure of protecting 
foreign workers’ rights. Consequently, the Bahraini government announced the introduction 
of a “flexible” work permit for irregular migrant workers that would allow them to be their 
own sponsors during two years and covering their own expenses . This visa presents several 139
advantages and facilitates migrant workers mobility in the labour market, however not all 
foreign workers are eligible for it. Domestic workers, skilled workers and “runaway 
criminals ” are excluded . On another note, to be able to apply for the “flexible” work 140 141
permit, a migrant worker has to provide a valid passport, which in many cases they will not 
posses, since there is no specific law in Bahrain that prohibits the confiscation of passports. 
Despite all that, Bahrain remains the country within the GCC with most flexible mobility 
policies for migrant workers. 
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Kuwait declared in 2010 that the government would work on abolishing Kafala system by 
February 2011, yet before that date other announcements were made retracting from that 
position and announcing lighter amendments that would focus mainly on broader mobility in 
the labor market . Even though back then these announcements positioned the country as the 142
second one making more efforts to dismantle Kafala, currently the system still regulates the 
relationship between employers and foreign workers, and workers are highly unprotected. A 
slight intent of reform was made in 2016 with the Administrative Decision No. 378/2016 
allowing migrant workers in the private sector to transfer employment without authorization 
of the kafeel after 3 years of work . However, this decision excluded migrant domestic 143
workers who still need consent to transfer employment. Moreover, domestic workers in the 
country are also excluded from the labour law. Instead, a law regulating specifically domestic 
work was issued in 2015 . However, it has proven to fall short of protecting these workers’ 144
rights according to international labour standards . Yet, Kuwait was the first country of the 145
region to set a minimum wage for domestic workers, which was set around 60 dinars 
($200) . 146
Oman has taken very few steps to reform Kafala in the past, however this changed in 2020 
when the government decided to ease restrictions in the field of transfer of employment. Prior 
to that, in 2003, the government issued a law that made working for an employer that was not 
the kafeel illegal, in order to prevent exploitative practices and human trafficking, but that 
failed to increase protections in terms of international labor standards for migrants . 147
Decision No.157/2020  materialized just recently, but the Omani government had 148
announced already in 2016 that authorization from the employer would no longer be 
mandatory. This was due to the observable improvement in the economy following the same 
decision that neighboring countries took .  Nonetheless, this reform applies only after two 149
years of employment. This means that migrant workers can only transfer employment without 
 A. Khan & H. Harroff-Travel (2011) “ Reforming the Kafala: Challenges and opportunities moving 142
forward” . Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, Vol. 20, Nos. 3-4. Pages 293 - 297.
 HRW (2016) “Letter to His Excellency Sabah Al-Khalid Al-Sabah”. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/143
2016/09/30/letter-his-excellency-sabah-al-khalid-al-sabah#_ftn45 [Last consulted: 1st April 2021]
 Law No. 68 of 2015 on Employment of Domestic Workers. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/144
natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=101760 [Last consulted: 1st April 2021]
 International Labor Organization (2017) Employer-Migrant worker relationships in the Middle East: 145
Exploring scope for internal labor market mobility and fair migration. Regional Office for Arab States; Beirut. 
Pages 12 - 15.
 MEE (2016) “Kuwait becomes first Gulf state to set minimum wage for domestic workers”. Available at: 146
https://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/news/kuwait-becomes-first-gulf-state-sets-minimum-wage-domestic-
workers-948977539 [Last consulted: 1st April 2021]
 A. Khan & H. Harroff-Travel (2011) “ Reforming the Kafala: Challenges and opportunities moving 147
forward” . Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, Vol. 20, Nos. 3-4. Pages 293 - 297.
 Decision No.157/2020 amendments to the provisions of the executive regulations of the Foreigners Residence 148
Law Available at: https://data.qanoon.om/ar/md/rop/2020-0157.pdf [Last consulted: 1st April 2021]
 International Labor Organization (2017) Employer-Migrant worker relationships in the Middle East: 149
Exploring scope for internal labor market mobility and fair migration. Regional Office for Arab States; Beirut. 
Pages 12 - 15.
38
CEI, Centro Adscrito a la Universitat de Barcelona  Nº 10/2021, 22 DE JUNIO DE2021 COLECCIÓN 
TRABAJOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN DEL M.U. EN DIPLOMACIA Y ORGANIZACIONES INTERNACIONALES
authorization after two years of contract. It is not clear if migrant domestic workers can 
benefit from this reform, since the amendment is supposed to cover all foreign workers. 
However, according to Decree No. 189/2004 on labour rules and conditions for domestic 
employees , domestic workers are not allowed to transfer employment without authorization 150
of the employer and the latter has to complete all necessary procedures in this regard .  151
Qatar announced back in 2010 one of the most important steps taken by any country of the 
region to ensure migrants’ rights. The government intended to require companies to provide 
details regarding the monthly salaries of their workers, which would allow the authorities to 
know which workers were being paid on time or if there were any delays. Yet to this date this 
measure has not been implemented . In 2015, Law No.21 (2015) Regulating Entry, Exit and 152
Residence of expatriates , was supposed to enhance mobility of migrant workers by 153
eliminating the need of authorization for the transfer of employment. However, in practice, 
this law’s main success was to remove the terminology of sponsorship, while conditions for 
migrant workers remained almost the same . This law was amended in August 2020, 154
removing the need for authorization to transfer employment at any point by noticing the 
employer .This law does not cover domestic work, since it is covered by a specific law that 155
allows domestic workers to terminate their employment with or without previous notice . 156
Even though these are important steps, they do not address widespread abuse against migrant 
workers and ineffective implementation of these measures is still a major challenge. This has 
been captured by the compilation of testimonies of abuse, exploitation and death of migrants 
in the country, in particular during the World Cup 2022 campaign . In these regard, the 157
country made important reforms during 2020 after international criticism increased during the 
preparations for the World Cup, however in February 2021 the country’s Shura Council made 
took a step behind and most of these initiatives will no longer be applicable. 
The United Arab Emirates announced in 2009 the implementation of a Wage Protection 
System to monitor payments to migrant workers and identify delays. In the same sense, 
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authorities declared that migrant workers were allowed to transfer employment if their wages 
were delayed by more than two months and would be entitled to visa extensions. However 
these reforms did not really materialize in practice . Yet, in 2015 the government issued 158
three new Decrees that represented important change in Kafala and intended to implement the 
measures that were announced since 2009. Through these decrees the migrant worker is 
entitled to unilaterally terminate employment at any time, transfer employment without 
authorization when the employer has failed to comply with their contractual obligations, and 
established a mechanism to resolve workers’ complaints, as well as issue sanctions against 
fraudulent employers . 159
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Jordan on the other hand have not been willing to reform 
or abolish Kafala. In the case of KSA, its government announced already in 2011 that they 
were not predisposed to reform, which is very worrying since it is the country that hosts the 
largest number of migrant workers . In March 2021, the country introduced labor law 160
reforms that affect a limited number of migrant workers by letting them transfer employment 
without authorization, when certain narrow circumstances are met. This amendment falls very 
short on protecting migrant workers’ rights, not only because it excludes all migrant workers 
not covered by the labor law, such as domestic workers and farmers . But also because it 161
does not address any abusive practices or advocate for the respect of international labor 
standards. In the case of Jordan, no reforms have been conducted even to facilitate mobility of 
the worker. 
All the GCC countries have taken steps to reform the system at different extents. Even in the 
countries who claimed aiming to abolish the Kafala system, namely Bahrain and Kuwait, the 
implementation of their reforms falls very far from that goal. Instead, these countries have 
accomplished a more flexible policy in regards of transfer of employment. Amendments to 
this factor translate to better conditions for the migrant workers, who would be able to shift 
employers when subjected to exploitative and abusive situations. However, these flexibilities 
do not apply to migrant domestic workers, who remain unprotected and unable to liberate 
themselves from exploitation and abuse without falling in an irregular situation. Qatar, UAE 
and Oman have also been taken moderate steps towards ensuring rights and protections to 
migrant workers by easing transfer of employment. Moreover, both Qatar and UAE designed 
mechanisms to control the payment of wages, but they have not been able to materialize them 
in practice.  In general, as it can be observed, these reforms tackle the transfer of employment 
because it has been proven to convert in economical benefits for the host countries. On the 
contrary, initiatives that actually translate on granting rights and protections to the migrants 
are not being entirely pursued.  
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4.2 Lebanon’s approach 
In general, Lebanon can be placed as one of the countries that has done less efforts to reform 
the Kafala system . Human rights defendants and experts have deemed Kafala as a modern 162
form of slavery or human trafficking and condemned the abuses to migrant workers in the 
country. In particular, the United States has been one of the countries who leads such critiques 
and accusations, by placing Lebanon on Tier 2 Watch List in terms of human trafficking in 
2000, where the country still remains today. 
“Women from Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Ethiopia, and Madagascar who travel to Lebanon 
voluntarily and legally to work in domestic service, with the assistance of recruitment agencies, often 
find themselves in conditions of forced labor, including through the use of such practices as 
withholding of passports, non-payment of wages, restrictions on movement, verbal abuse, and 
physical assault. Workers who leave their employer's house without permission automatically lose 
their legal status unless a change in sponsorship is prearranged and approved by General Security, 
the government agency responsible for the entry, residency, and departure of foreign workers. In some 
cases, employers have kept foreign domestic workers confined in houses for years. ” 163
Already then, the recommendations were suggested to the country to redeem itself and put an 
end to those practices. 
“(…) enact the draft Labor Law amendment extending legal protections to foreign workers (…) 
enforce the law prohibiting the confiscation of domestic workers’ passports, (…) increase formal 
bilateral partnerships and systematic information sharing with governments of source countries to 
better protect migrant workers from abuse and resolve cases of administrative detention, (…) provide 
the unified employment contract in the native languages of immigrating domestic workers ”.  164
However, still to this date, no major action has been taken by the Lebanese government and 
none of these recommendations have been materialized in practice. In particular, through the 
testimonies and interviews conducted for the sake of this paper, one can come to realize that 
the practice of confiscating passports, even though it is prohibited by law, is still very 
common and encouraged by recruitment agencies and General Security. With the current 
crisis and specifically during the months of complete lockdown -including closure of the 
airport-, bilateral partnerships between Lebanon and countries of origin would have helped 
alleviate the hardships of stranded migrants whose desire was to return home. 
Even though the system affects all migrant workers and these recommendations aim to 
enhance protections for all of them, one can not forget that domestic workers are placed in a 
very vulnerable situation among all the migrant collectives. Migrant workers are regulated 
under the Kafala, thus excluded from labor laws and its protections. Moreover, domestic work 
is not included in the labor laws because of the perceived private nature of housework. 
Lebanese labour legislation, in line with other GCC countries and Jordan, understands that 
domestic servants are to be treated as members of the family in order to preserve the privacy 
of the household. In addition, the fact that households are not considered as a workplace adds 
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to the circumstance that private persons are also not considered as employers, thus domestic 
workers are not employees according to the national legislation, and their work remains 
unprotected . Even though this idea justifies the exclusion of domestic work from labor 165
laws, in the past years some countries have been revising this statement or have been 
exploring alternatives to it. Acknowledging that the exclusion of domestic work from their 
labor laws puts the workers in a very vulnerable situation, where they are not entitled to any 
protection, not even from optional protections under any other law . Moreover, the 166
protections that should have been granted by an alternative system, namely the Kafala system, 
are being perverted against the worker and misused by exacerbating the asymmetrical balance 
of power between parties. The exclusion of domestic work from the Labor Code clashes with 
Article 7 provision of the ICESCR that Lebanon has both signed and ratified: 
“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just 
and favorable conditions of work which ensure, in particular: 
(a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with: 
(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in 
particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with 
equal pay for equal work; 
(ii) A decent living for themselves and their families in accordance with the provisions of the present 
Covenant; 
(b) Safe and healthy working conditions; 
(c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to an appropriate higher level, 
subject to no considerations other than those of seniority and competence; 
(d ) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay, as well 
as remuneration for public holidays” . 167
Instead, in 2009, Lebanon put in place a Standard Unified Contract for domestic workers that 
stands as the sole legal document regulating the relationship between the employer and the 
domestic worker in the country. The SUC was supposed to establish a certain degree of 
protection to fill the gaps from the lack of coverage from the Lebanese labor law to this field 
of work. However, this contract has proven unable to successfully guarantee international 
labor standards. Moreover, even though other countries in the region pushed for reforming 
restrictions regarding mobility of foreign workers that resulted in economic benefits, no 
reforms have been conducted to facilitate transfer of employment, since authorization from 
the employer is still a requirement . 168
Nonetheless, the current crisis situation is striking as a factor of change for the Kafala system 
in the country. Due to the dollar shortage, the migrant worker sector and the system behind it 
has faced an unprecedented existential challenge. Lebanon has been attracting thousands of 
foreign workers every year, but the current situation has proved that Lebanese kafeels are 
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unable to arrange workers’ recruitment processes or to fulfill their obligations under the 
contract . According to experts and activists, the crisis is opening the door to reforms that 169
could extend the coverage of the Lebanese labor law to migrant and domestic workers, 
abolishing the Kafala system. However, despite clear steps in the right direction, the same 
experts and activists fear that they will not materialize in practice . This is affected by the 170
fact that Lebanon is a country very dependent on the Kafala system and run by a deeply 
corrupt government that favors the ones who profit from leaving the system untouched . 171
4.2.1  The “new” Standard Unified Contract (SUC) 
The consequences of the economic crisis that Lebanon is facing have been affecting 
employment for both nationals and migrants, but due to the already vulnerable situation that 
migrants had in the country, it has been extremely challenging for this collective. In April 
2019, the Lebanese Ministry of Labor with the support of the International Labour 
Organization coordinated a Working Group for the reform of Kafala that was formed by 
national and international NGOs that work with migrants in the country . Their 172
recommendation was to adopt a revised Standard Unified Contract for the employment of 
migrant domestic workers that would address the main deficiencies identified on the previous 
version and would reduce the risk of forced labor associated with the system. 
The new Standard Unified Contract was supposed to be adopted in September 2020. In 
general, it grants a deeper respect to internationally established labor standards, but against 
what the Ministry of Labor announced, it does not abolish Kafala system nor eliminate the 
dependency of the migrant domestic worker towards their kafeel . It introduces 173
improvements in terms of the scope of domestic workers’ duties and tasks, making the 
employer establish in the contract a closed list of them, which can not exceed one or two jobs, 
and reiterates on prohibiting the kafeel to employ the worker in more than one household. It 
also enhances the duties of the employer to respect the privacy of the worker by ensuring that 
the worker would have her own room with a key that only her will posses . Moreover, it 174
guarantees the worker with the basic rights of mobility, to avoid domestic workers being 
captive for years, to respect their days off and holiday leaves, and stresses on the rights of 
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owning a mobile phone and accessing the internet . Moreover, the contract accentuates on 175
the fact that the worker has the right to own a copy of the contract in a language that she can 
understand. These provisions also represent an upgrade for domestic workers’ identification 
and report of abuse and exploitation. 
One of the most important changes that the contract introduces is the establishment of a 
minimum wage for domestic workers, which is a first step to end the differences between 
national and non-national workers wages. The minimum wage is set in Lebanese pound and 
according to the Ministry of Labor maximum deductions of 30% can be made to it to cover 
for in-kind benefits such as food, clothing and housing fee. Thus, the minimum wage after 
deductions would be 472,500 Lebanese pounds . Then the salary would be established in the 176
contract by the parties, but it would not be less than the established minimum wage. The 
contract also states that the wages shall be paid at the end of every month. However, as 
experts pointed, the Ministry of Labor should take into consideration the discrepancy among 
exchanges rates due to the current economic crisis in wage calculations . This upgrade on 177
the international labor standards that are to be guaranteed to migrant workers in the country 
adds to the fact that the new SUC also establishes a maximum of working daily and weekly 
hours by applying the same provisions that are granted under the Lebanese labor law. Thus, 
working hours should not exceed the eight hours per day and, exceptionally, workers might be 
asked to work overtime for a maximum of 12 hours daily and getting paid at a 50% higher 
rate . Weekly hours can not exceed 48 working hours and a weekly break of at least 24 178
hours is to be granted to the worker.  
The contract further improves conditions for migrant workers establishing more conditions 
under which the employee can unilaterally terminate the contract and the employer should 
still pay for all legal entitlements and travel costs back to their country. This provision is of 
particular importance because it intends to liberate the migrants from the widely common 
“hostage situation” that many migrants face , when employers restrict the rights of the 179
worker in order to protect the investment of the recruitment. To be able to enforce this newly 
acquired worker’s right, but at the same time continue protecting the Lebanese kafeels, the 
Ministry of Labor proposed a formula. In case that the worker is willing to transfer to another 
employer, both the previous and future employers should split the costs of recruitment based 
on the time that they would benefit from the worker’s services. Whereas in the case that the 
worker is willing to return home, the recruitment agency would be responsible for paying for 
part of the costs of the recruitment process. However, it is not specified how the employer and 
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the agency would share this cost . This provision also intends to end with the confiscation of 180
passports, even though there is a specific provision regarding this particular practice in the 
contract. One of the specific reasons that are listed for the migrant to be able to exercise the 
right to unilaterally terminate the contract is when the employer withholds her passport or 
other personal documents. In consequence, these provisions are aiming to reduce the 
“runaway” phenomenon and the consequently irregular situation that emanates from this 
practice. Moreover, by enhancing prohibitions on passport confiscation the Ministry is 
intending to prevent undocumented migrants, thus reducing their vulnerability factors. 
Moreover, the SUC condemns all forms of abuse, harassment, intimidation and violence by 
stressing on the fact that the working environment must be suitable and safe, and giving the 
worker the right of terminating contract when this is not fulfilled. 
Finally, the new standard unified contract also establishes the right of the worker to designate 
a third party in the country, which can be a person or an institution, to be contacted in case of 
emergency . This progressive provision intends to guarantee more paths for protection for 181
the worker and motivate workers to claim their rights when there is a dispute with the 
employer through this third party. However, for this provision to work effectively there must 
be efforts in place to restore migrants’ trust on the governmental bodies. 
Notwithstanding the improvements that the new SUC represents, one can not forget that it is 
only a temporary solution and that efforts that have been put on drafting such a contract could 
have been put on stronger steps to abolish the system. Moreover, as experts and activists 
pointed out, this contract still reflects discriminatory practices and procreates the asymmetric 
relation between employers and employees, since it keeps the balance of power on the side of 
the employer . In addition, experts are also concerned about the fact that gaps on protection 182
might emanate from the unclear wording and weak content of the new draft . Also, as it has 183
been repeatedly said, even the improvements that this contract represents in paper have yet to 
be materialized and that would not be possible without a governmental body who acts as a 
guarantor of such provisions. As it has been seen in practice, for the workers to actually be 
able to benefit from these upgrades, they should be granted a copy of the contract prior to 
their arrival to Lebanon in a language that they can understand. There should be in place a 
mechanism that monitors wages being paid entirely and in timely manner, as well as 
monitoring the compliance of the working conditions.  
The most problematic clauses of the contract are regarding contract termination. 
Acknowledging that there has been an improvement for the workers to exercise this right, the 
contract enables the employer to do the same. Thus, the employer can terminate the contract 
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at any point informing the worker with one month in advance, or dismiss the worker without 
prior notice when the latter fails to complete her duties without cause. However, when the 
employer exercises the right to terminate the contract, the worker is not able to demand wages 
owed, nor is she granted any compensation from the employer or the recruitment agency . 184
This fact leaves the worker in a very vulnerable situation, because she can be dismissed at any 
point, which differs from the provisions of the Lebanese labor law that establish the obligation 
of three written warnings before dismissal and the right of compensation. Moreover, it does 
not take into consideration that in general workers also incur in high expenses to travel and be 
employed in Lebanon. 
Furthermore, taking into consideration the exploitative and abusive practices in the country, it 
becomes evident that the new SUC only partially addresses the problems identified. First of 
all, the fact that rights and duties are written in a contract solves the issue of unclarity that 
results from Kafala being a customary practice. However, as experts have pointed out, the 
contract itself does not use very clear wording and there is big room for interpretation. 
Secondly, even if the contract establishes a wider range of protections for the worker, there is 
no mechanism in place to ensure that the contract will be produced in a language that the 
worker can understand and that she would be holding a copy of it. As one can come to realize 
from the testimonies presented, part of the deception from the migrants comes from their 
country of origin. The contract should not be only be displayed once in Lebanon, but also in 
the country of origin of the workers, so they would be completely informed prior their 
decision to migrate. That would solve situations such as what “Lily” and “Mary” faced when 
they were given false information in the recruitment agencies at their countries of origin. 
Thirdly, for the provisions that prohibit restriction on mobility, ensure days off, limit the 
working hours and enable communication with third parties, even though they are extremely 
positive because these are problems that were identified in practice, the contract does not 
establish any mechanism to secure that these would be respected. In this regard, one can not 
forget that to a lower extent, some of these rights were already established in the 2009 SUC, 
but they were not being respected, nor monitored due to the private nature of the household. 
Similar challenges can be faced with the right of the workers to keep their passports and 
identity documents. In this case, the competent authorities should ensure that this practice is 
not encouraged by recruitment agencies and General Security. Fourthly, regarding the salaries, 
acknowledging the introduction of a minimum wage for domestic work is a very important 
step. Challenges due to the discrepancy in the exchange rates have already been explained. 
Knowing that the expectation of higher salaries due to misinformation in the country of origin 
is another reason for workers’ deception, there should be mechanisms in place to ensure that 
the information received in the home country is true. In addition, the in-kind 30% deductible 
part of the salary can present certain challenges because it leaves it to the will of the employer 
to determine the amount of food and clothing to provide and the range to deduct from this 
percentage. 
The SUC entered into force in September 2020, however it did not last long. In October, the 
Syndicate of the Owners of the Recruitment Agencies in Lebanon (SORAL) appealed in the 
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Shura Council  against the reforms that the new SUC established, arguing that it would 185
clash with existing labor laws . SORAL was successful with their accusations against the 186
new contract, therefore the reforms were not applied on the grounds that the new contract 
“could inflict huge harm to the worker recruitment sector” . Thus, the version of the SUC 187
approved in 2009 is being applied. Even though the new SUC was not a major reform to the 
system and did not establish any new mechanisms for the enforcement of the provisions, it 
faced very strong opposition from the collectives that benefit from the Kafala system. This 
fact shows the difficulty that the country still faces in terms of moving towards meaningful 
reforms and how the deeply corrupted institutions will not stand by the side of the most 
vulnerable. 
4.2.2 Recent developments and other alternatives 
Regardless of the challenges that the process of reforming Kafala faces, experts and activists 
still believe that the current situation, namely the socioeconomic crisis, the global pandemic 
and the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement, can arise as a catalyst for change in this 
regard . The dismissal of the new Standard Unified Contract was a real disappointment to 188
migrants’ rights and steps to dismantle the Kafala system. However, it also arises as an 
opportunity to leave behind short term solutions that are only patches to the real problems and 
push for the only long term reasonable solution possible, which is the abolishment of the 
system. 
In this sense, the country has been pursuing other goals that also intend to improve migrant 
workers’ lives and labor rights in Lebanon. For instance, the National Steering Committee On 
Women Migrant Domestic Workers was established in 2005. Since its establishment, the 
partners that are part of this committee, namely the Ministry of Labor, other UN agencies, 
government institutions and NGOs, have been meeting on a monthly basis . Among their 189
most renowned achievements, they have been working on fairer recruitment processes. For 
this reason, they launched in 2013 a Code of Conduct that serves as a guide for recruitment 
agencies to promote and protect the rights of the migrant domestic workers in the country. 
This Code of Conduct was meant to balance the interests of recruitment agencies and 
domestic workers. However, in practice, the agencies are still one of the actors who perpetrate 
abuse and exploitation. On the other hand, the National Steering Committee also pushed for a 
blacklisting process of abusive employers and recruiters conducted by the Ministry of 
 The Lebanese State Shura Council, which was established by Law No. 10434 of 14 June 1975 (Statute of the 185
State Council), is currently the only administrative jurisdiction in Lebanon. 
 L’Orient Today (2020) “The crisis, an opportunity to break the corrupt Kafala system”. Available at: https://186
today.lorientlejour.com/article/1243877/the-crisis-an-opportunity-to-break-the-corrupt-kafala-system.html [Last 
consulted: 4th April 2021]
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April 2021]
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today.lorientlejour.com/article/1243877/the-crisis-an-opportunity-to-break-the-corrupt-kafala-system.html [Last 
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Labor . The details of the blacklist are not public and experts agree that there are insufficient 190
audits and inspections to feed it . However, this procedure took an important role during the 191
pandemic, since according to the General Security, employers that were abandoning their 
workers with unpaid wages in front of the embassies were being blacklisted. Employers that 
have been blacklisted are unable to sponsor another worker, but employers can find ways to 
avoid this prohibition. 
Furthermore, activists see the current moment as an opportunity to push for the rights of 
migrants to form and lead a workers’ union. Migrant domestic workers in Lebanon, as all 
foreign workers, are denied by the Lebanese Labour Law of the right to elect or be elected as 
union representatives. This disposition of the Lebanese Labour Code clashes with 
internationally recognized rights to which Lebanon is bound, such as Article 22 of the ICCPR: 
“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and 
join trade unions for the protection of his interests” . 192
Self-organized groups of migrants have proved to be extremely efficient and necessary in the 
time of crisis, being able to identify vulnerable migrants and provide basic aid, such as food 
or shelter, or refer them to organizations who provide services for migrant workers in need. 
Being able to exercise the right of association would mean that migrants themselves would be 
able to stand as an actor of change for the improvement of regulations regarding migrant 
workers and their enforcement . 193
Finally, one more step towards improvement for the conditions of migrant domestic workers 
was adopted this past February 2021 by General Security. According to this decision, 
employers are no longer able to accuse a migrant domestic worker of being “runaways” if 
they leave the workplace. In consequence, these migrants, who often are escaping from 
abusive situations, can not be persecuted or taken punitive measures against . This decision 194
not only represents an important step in practice, since migrant domestic workers who left an 
abusive or exploitative workplace will not be treated as criminals, but also it has an impact on 
the terminology used by the authorities. They will no longer be using terms such as 
“runaway” or “escape”, because they are contrary to human rights . 195
 Dissent (2017) “A Day Out and a Union: Lebanon’s Domestic Workers Organize” Available at: https://190
www.dissentmagazine.org/article/lebanon-domestic-workers-organize-union-kafala [Last consulted: 5th April 
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Brief-1.pdf [Last consulted: 5th April 2021]
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
The Kafala system is the migration policy that applies in the GCC countries, namely Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and in Lebanon, 
and Jordan, to recruit labor migration. It establishes the framework that defines the 
relationship between the employer and the migrant worker, with the unique characteristic that 
it binds the latter to the former not only as per the labor contract, but also as per the residency 
permits in the host country. This fact stands as the core of the main criticisms against the 
system, because it renders the migrant worker completely dependent on their employer. Thus, 
the system enables an asymmetrical relationship between the parties, overbalanced in favor of 
the employers, who not only satisfy their labour needs, but also are able to exercise an 
unacceptably high amount of control over the life of the worker. The imbalance of power is 
such that labor migration in these countries is widely known for situations of exploitation and 
abuse, as well as inhuman treatment of the workers that are clearly against human rights and 
internationally accepted labour standards. 
Even though the Kafala establishes rights and duties for both parts of the labor relationship, a 
great cause of the power imbalance between the parties is the fact that, in general, only the 
worker fears the consequences of not fulfilling them. Thus, when the employers fail to fulfill 
one of the main duties towards the worker, namely renewing the residency permit, there are 
no punitive measures to be enforced towards them. On the contrary, the migrant workers, who 
can not perform such bureaucratic duties by him or herself, would fall into an irregular 
situation and loss their rights to be in the country. Thus, if caught by the authorities, face 
detention, deportation and high fines. Moreover, there are also no mechanisms that monitor 
that other duties of the employer are being fulfilled towards the worker. For example, there is 
not a system in place to oversee if the employer is paying the salaries in full and in a timely 
manner to the migrant worker. In consequence, many are retained salaries for several months 
or even the whole duration of their contract, and there is no authority or body they can appeal 
to to denounce this fact. From the experiences of the workers, one can come to realize that in 
the majority of cases they can not even resource to their embassies. In general, migrant 
workers express their lack of trust towards embassies and consulates, based on the fact that 
they tend to side with the governments of the host countries and corruption. On the other 
hand, when the countries of origin have aimed to give a response to these situations of abuse 
that affect their nationals, the outcome has not been in favor of the workers. For example, the 
case of Ethiopia or Bangladesh that banned their female nationals from migrating to the GCC 
countries, Lebanon, and Jordan to work. These kind of policies increase the risk of trafficking, 
and smuggling, and irregularity upon arrival . 196
Such a system is justified on the grounds that the Arab identity needs to be protected. This is 
due to the fact that nationals have become a minority in their own countries, as a result of the 
high demand of foreign manpower in the region. A system like Kafala facilitates migrant 
labor force that is inexpensive and easy to replace, since it does not encourage integration. On 
the contrary, by issuing residency permits that are linked exclusively to work permits and 
placing a sponsor that mediates between the State and the migrant, the sense of non belonging 
is enhanced. This fact is taken to the extreme, when one realizes that the personal life of the 
 R. Jureidini (2002) “Women Migrant Domestic Workers in Lebanon”. Gulf Labour Markets and Migration. 196
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workers is highly controlled to prevent their further stay in the host country. Moreover, 
employers and other sponsors condone their degrading practices towards migrant workers on 
the basis that their investment needs to be protected. The exploitative and abusive situations 
are a result of the lack of mechanisms under Kafala that protect both parts of the labor 
relationship. However, employers can make use of the power imbalance to protect 
themselves, whereas migrant workers do not have any resource.  
Female migrant workers are typically employed in the GCC countries, Lebanon, and Jordan 
as domestic workers. As a collective, migrant domestic workers are deemed to be at the peek 
of vulnerability among migrant workers. This is not only due to their labor relationship being 
regulated under Kafala, but also because they face gender-based discrimination. Moreover, 
the most important factor that contributes to their vulnerable situation is that domestic work is 
generally unregulated and not covered by national labor laws, which increases the risk of 
abuse, violence and exploitation, due to lack of protections. In their case, the power imbalance 
is exacerbated because migrant domestic workers depend on the employer for their daily 
sustenance and shelter, on top of their residency and working permits. Consequently, the level 
of control that the employer can enforce on the worker is much higher. This fact emerges in 
the form of very abusive practices, such as passport confiscation, limitation on 
communication, limitations on mobility, exploitative working conditions, inhuman or 
degrading living conditions and low or unpaid wages. And even if host countries aim to 
enforce mechanisms to protect migrant domestic workers from these situations, it has proven 
very difficult for such initiatives to be enforced in the privacy of the household. However, in 
practice, when the aforementioned countries have pushed for reforms, almost never migrant 
domestic workers were included among the collectives that could benefit from them. 
Migrant workers and activists have been proclaiming that the only possible long-term solution 
to end such abusive practices is the abolishment of the Kafala system. In the past years, 
governments of the countries that apply Kafala have been announcing their will to reform or 
even abolish the system. However, countries that were aiming for more drastic steps have 
retracted with time, facing major opposition from the parties that benefit from the system as it 
is. Thus, the reforms that have materialized in practice mainly address labour market mobility, 
rather than increasing protections towards migrant workers and end all the exploitative and 
abusive practices that have been internationally denounced for years. Nonetheless, one should 
not overrule all the possibilities of improvement based on the fact that Kafala system is far 
from being abolished. Around the world, other systems of sponsorship are used as migration 
policies, but they do not share with Kafala the imbalance of powers between the parties. Nor 
do they share the unclarity of the rule itself, since they are not customary practices. Lastly, 
they also differentiate from Kafala by the fact that the State still grants protections to the 
migrants sponsored, so they do not fall in a complete situation of neglect in the host country. 
Taking those facts into consideration, there is much place for reform in the framework of 
Kafala that would signify a beneficial development on labour migration in the region. 
In these sense, alternatives like the one pursued by Lebanon, namely the Standard Unified 
Contract, might not be an ideal solution but present advantages that, if materialized in 
practice, would represent a big step forward. Moreover, as many activists and researchers 
highlighted, the current moment represents for Lebanon an opportunity to change. Migrant 
50
CEI, Centro Adscrito a la Universitat de Barcelona  Nº 10/2021, 22 DE JUNIO DE2021 COLECCIÓN 
TRABAJOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN DEL M.U. EN DIPLOMACIA Y ORGANIZACIONES INTERNACIONALES
workers, and in particular migrant domestic workers, have been light shedded into their 
situation, that until that very moment was not being looked at. The Lebanese society is now 
more aware of the hardships of this community and increasingly ready to demand for reforms. 
Although solutions to the lack of protection of workers might seem clear and obvious to the 
reader, major obstacles are impeding their implementation. Initiatives that have been aiming 
to protect workers from these abusive practices, have faced major opposition that impeded 
their realization. For example, the Standard Unified Contract in Lebanon, had less than two 
weeks of implementation, before the SORAL appealed against it in front of the Shura 
Council. On another hand, countries of origin and migrant workers themselves, should make 
more efforts to ensure that real information about the migrant process and the scenarios in the 
host countries are reaching potential migrants. The lack of real information is a phenomenon 
that has been studied by the experts in the field. To this point, it is not very clear what is the 
reason why migrant workers do not share their experiences of abuse and exploitation in their 
countries of origin, to prevent others to fall under the same situations. However, it seems to be 
related to stigma, pride and fear to lose the independency that they gained by migrating. 
Finally, the fact that there is not enough pressure from the International Community to abolish 
or reform Kafala also stands as a challenge to improve migrant workers conditions in the 
region. The United Nations, the United States, and the European Union all have criticized the 
system, but non of them has taken any concrete measures against it. 
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